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INTRODUCTION
Ownership of real property has never been recognized as conferring
an absolute right to do whatever one pleases with his property.' One
of the common law concepts which recognizes and effects such limitations on the rights of property owners is the law of nuisance. Generally, a nuisance can be described as: 2
1.

See Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 PA. L. REv. 691

(1938); Cross, The Diminishing Fee, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 517 (1955).

2. CocHRAN's LAW LEXICON 219 (4th ed. 1956); see notes 19-32, 224-237 and accompanying text, infra; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214-15 (4th ed. 1951); see
generally 39 Am. JuR. Nuisances (1942); 66 C.J.S. Nuisances (1950).
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Thx. L. REv. 399 at 410 (1942) cautions at
410:

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
[a]nything not authorized by law which worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage. It may be (a) private, as where one so uses
his property as to damage another's or disturb his quiet enjoyment of it; (b) public, or common, where the whole community
is annoyed or inconvenienced by the offensive acts....
Viewing nuisance as a mode of land use control, it can be defined
as unreasonable interference caused by unreasonable use of property.
In the case of private nuisance, the interference is with the individual's right to use and enjoy his property; while with public
nuisance, the interference is with the rights of a considerable number
of persons or their properties. Private nuisance developed chiefly as
a creature of the common law, but conduct constituting a public
nuisance is frequently identified by statutes. Where statutes do not
identify conduct as a public nuisance, principles which have been
developed by decisional law may furnish a basis for finding a public
nuisance, and many of the principles so applied are identical or similar to those applicable to private nuisances.
Another dimension is added to nuisance law by the range of available remedies. These remedies include abatement, injunction, contempt, damages, and declaratory judgments; and in the case of public
"Nuisance," unhappily, has been a sort of legal garbage can. The word has been
used to designate anything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked
in a pie. Coupled with the dubious notion of "attraction," it has been applied even
to conditions dangerous to trespassing children. Blackstone defines it as "Anything
that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage, or which is done to the hurt of the
lands, tenements or hereditaments of another"--which certainly is broad enough
to cover all conceivable torts. There has been a deplorable tendency to use the word
as a substitute for any thought about a problem, to call something a nuisance and
let it go at that. If "nuisance" is to mean anything at all, it is necessary to disregard
much of this as mere aberration.
RESTATEmENT OP TORTS ch. 40 (1939) generally avoided the use of the term "nuisance"
and identified its discussion of private nuisance with the title, "Invasions of Interests in
the Private Use of Land (Private Nuisance)." The avoidance of reliance on the term
"private nuisance" was thought desirable because of the confusion and uncertainty of its
meaning. Id. at 215. There was no discussion of public nuisance. RESTATEENT (SEcoNn)
o, ToRT § 821A (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) revives the use of the term "nuisance,"
stating that it is ". . . used to denote either (a) a public nuisance . . . . or (b) a
private nuisance .... " The Tentative Draft's analysis is then grounded upon the concepts of public and private nuisance.
There are some nuisances that may also constitute actionable wrongs under other
traditional theories of law; these related theories are beyond the scope of analysis of
this comment, but the reader should be alert to the possibility that a court might decide
a particular case on the basis of such other theories as are relevant. Perhaps the most
pervasive example is found in cases involving riparian rights to water. See generally
RESTATEmENT op TORTS ch. 41 (1939); Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes
and Streams, 35 WAsir. L. REv. 580 (1960).
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nuisance, criminal sanctions. The conditions under which any one
of these remedies is available differ from the conditions under which
a different remedy may be given. These differences make it difficult
to abstract principles from the cases because it is often difficult or
impossible to ascertain whether the court's reasoning was directed
to the issue of the existence of a nuisance or of the appropriateness
of a particular remedy. In any event, selection of proper remedies is
an important element in any nuisance case and should be undertaken
with extreme care.
Nuisance law is flexible and its principles are vague and imprecise,
making it almost impossible to predict the outcome of most cases.
Because of this imprecision, comprehensive land use controls, largely
legislative and administrative in nature, have grown to occupy almost
the full attention of land use planners and lawyers.3 Zoning is by far
3. See A. BETTMAN, CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 171 (A. Comey ed. 1946),
where it is argued in favor of zoning on the premise that nuisance law had severe
limitations:
[C]ases and enactments, coming before the courts from time to time, have produced
such elasticity of definition as to what is or may be declared a nuisance, that the
term has ceased to have any definite measure of legislative power. The decisions
upon the definition of nuisance have become utterly irreconcilable. . . . A lawyer
would often hardly hazard a guess as to whether his client's proposed industry will
or will not be declared a nuisance. There is something manifestly unfair in requiring
an owner of an industry to select and pay for his site, design his plant, and even
build before he can obtain any degree of assurance that he will be permitted to
operate. The zone plan, by comprehensively districting the whole territory of the
city and giving ample space and appropriate territory for each type of use is
decidedly more just, intelligent, and reasonable than the system, if system it can
be called, of spotty ordinances and uncertain litigations about the definition of a
nuisance. [From the author's brief, as amicus curiae, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)].
See N.

WILLIAMS,

JR.,

Tx

STRUCTURE

OF URBAN

ZONING

23

(1966),

reviewed in

Robbins, Book Review, 14 N.Y.L.F. 219 (1968), where the author states the modern case
for zoning:
Zoning is the most comprehensive and effective device available to carry out
public control of land use, with far more potentialities for intelligent and flexible
regulation than would ever be possible through nuisance or covenant law. For
zoning regulations are formulated by the public authorities, and make it possible
to indicate in advance the proper use of land over large areas. Moreover, zoning
regulations can be related to the land needs of various uses, and are potentially of
considerable value in regulating future loads on public facilities.
This conclusion leads Williams to identify nuisance and restrictive covenant actions as
"Pre-Zoning Techniques" of land use control. Id. at 11-22. The current impatience with
nuisance law is suggested by one student writer's conclusion that "in the future there
will be a decrease in the uncertainty caused by relating zoning with the confusing concept
of nuisance, proportionate to the increase in the scope and self-sufficiency of zoning."
Comment, Zoning and the Law of Nuisance, 29 FORD. L. Rv. 749, 756 (1961).
This comment presents an argument against regarding nuisance as a pre-zoning technique of land use control. While restrictive covenants are beyond the scope of the comment, it seems likely that it is also inappropriate to regard them as pre-zoning techniques.

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
the most pervasive mode of comprehensive land use control, and for a
time appeared to be, in effect, an heir to antiquated nuisance and
covenant actions. 4 For a number of years, however, certain inadequacies of zoning, primarily its rigidity, the mediocrity it has produced
in the development of land, and the parochialism it has enabled local
governmental entities to effect in land use decision making, have been
a matter of growing concern to planners.5 Several trends can be
observed in zoning law as a result of these concerns. One is a tendency
to seek representation of larger areas in the decision making process,
through regional or state planning.' Another is the frequent use of
traditional mechanisms for attaining flexibility in zoning, for example,
rezoning, variances, sinking zones, floating zones, contract zoning,
and selective non-enforcement of zoning ordinances.' Perhaps the
most widespread recently developed device for attaining flexibility is
the planned unit development.'

See, e.g., Reading v. Keller, 67 Wn. 2d 86, 406 P.2d 634 (1965); Mt. Baker Park Club
v. Colcock, 45 Wn. 2d 467, 275 P.2d 733 (1954); Comment, Restrictive Covenants and
Zoning Regulations, 31 TEN. L. REV. 353 (1964); 20 Am. JuR. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (1965).
4. See note 3, supra, and authorities cited therein.
5. F. BAm, JR. & E. BARTLEY, THE TExr oF A MODEL Zomnnr, ORwNrAscz 2 (3d
ed. 1966). The authors note that:
Zoning is increasingly under attack as a form of unnecessarily rigid regulation
rooted in outmoded tradition and inhibiting desirable change and experimentation.
Many of these criticisms are made by planners. The fault, however, does not lie
with zoning, which can be a very flexible instrument, but with failure to take
advantage of its flexibility.
See Makielski, Zoning: Legal Theory and Political Practice, 45 J. URn. L. 1 (1967);
Hanke, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 15
(1965); Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory
and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1965); Nixon, Jane Jacobs
and the Law-Zoning for Diversity Examined, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 314 (1967); Comment,
Regional Planning and Local Autonomy in Washington Zoning Law, 45 WASH. L. RaV.
593 (1970).
6. See Comment, Regional Planning and Local Autonomy in Washington Zoning
Law, 45 WAsH. L. Rxv. 593 (1970); Comment, Recent Trends in State Planning
Legislation: A Selective Survey, 16 Buy. L. Rav. 801 (1967).
7. See Sullivan, Flexibility and the Rule of Law in American Zoning Administration, LAW AND Lpam 129 (C. Haar ed. 1964); Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible, or Fluid,
44 J. URB. L. 287 (1967); Comment, Zoning Change: Flexibility v. Stability, 26 MD.
L. REv. 48 (1966); Note, Zoning-A Comprehensive Study of Problems and Solutions,
14 N.Y.LF. 79, 119-30 (1968); see also Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41
TEMPbw.
L.Q. 267 (1968) ; Comment, The Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning, 12 U.C.LA.L.
REv. 897 (1965); Comment Zoning and Concomitant Agreements, 3 GoNz. L. Rxv. 197
(1968).
8. See D. MANDELXE,
CONTROLLING PLANNED REsmENTAL DEVELOPMENTS (1966);
Symposium: Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 2 (1965).
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The basic problem underlying comprehensive land use control systems has been described as: 9
The need is to afford sufficient flexibility and responsiveness to
community needs to deal constructively with vicissitudinous
situations, yet to assure that zoning restraints are administered
pursuant to the rule of law, not unconfined discretion.
The Washington court has indicated an increasing willingness to
review actions of zoning officials to assure that those actions are
taken pursuant to the rule of law." Such judicial activity will probably result in practical problems in trying to assure flexibility in zoning
through the use of some of the traditional methods." Zoning officials
may also find that federal courts and agencies will take an increasing
interest in discouraging tight zoning ordinances which tend to discriminate against certain income or racial groups or reflect parochial
interests which are incompatible with sound regional development.' 2
These trends would seem to lead to the enactment of zoning ordinances which permit a wider range of uses in each zone in order to
assure needed flexibility without running afoul of due process and
equal protection requirements. 3
9. Sullivan, Flexibility and the Rule of Law in American Zoning Administration
LAW AND LAND 129 (C. Haar ed. 1964). He continues:

The rule of law, as the phrase is here used, is an ellipsis intended to suggest the
primary values to which policies promulgated and enforced in a democratic society
should adhere: that they be rational, and thus capable of articulation at a level of
generality removed from the facts to which they apply, rather than merely intuitive
and inexplicable; that such policies be reasonable in the sense that they be logically
defensible in terms of the context in which they will operate; and that such policies
be fair, in that the costs of the social gains sought to be implemented are distributed
equitably. All of these, of course, are values protected against extreme intrusions by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
See Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible, or Fluid, 44 J. URB. L. 287 (1967).
10. See Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 454 P.2d 832 (1969); cf. State v.
Work, 75 Wn. 2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 (1969); Pierce v. King County, 62 Wn. 2d 324, 382
P.2d 628 (1963) ; State v. Thomasson, 61 Wn. 2d 425, 378 P.2d 441 (1963).
11. Close scrutiny of local zoning officials by the courts would make it difficult to
rely on actions of such officials to provide required flexibility. Many actions would be
contested in court, in view of the substantial chance of showing some procedural
irregularity or some improperly considered factor which may have affected the official's
decision to modify zoning regulations.
12. See Morris and Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1968); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 767 (1969); Comment, Regional Planning
and Local Autonomy in Washington Zoning Law, 45 WAsH. L. Rv. 593 (1970).
13. A wider range of permitted uses in each zone would seem to decrease the need for
amending zone classifications, granting variances, etc. In addition, less rigid regulations
applicable to certain zones are probably the only means by which zoning authorities can
avoid excluding certain racial and income groups to a degree which is unacceptable.

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
Thus, it is highly probable that zoning and perhaps other types of
comprehensive land use controls will utilize increasingly flexible
restrictions. With this trend, landowners must expect less protection
of their individual interests from zoning than they have been able to
attain through rigid and highly restrictive ordinances, and without
heavy pressure from landowners, zoning officials should be more able
to concentrate their attention on public interests rather than those
of individual landowners. But this does not imply that the interests
of individuals should be ignored in the total system of land use controls. Those interests are as important as the public's interests, even
though public law systems may be inappropriate for protecting them.
It is at this juncture that private nuisance can be introduced as an
important modern mode of land use control. Individual landowners
who suffer unreasonable interference from a land use which is acceptable to the public may bring actions for private nuisance to secure
remedies appropriate to them as individuals.
As for public nuisance, the pervasiveness of existing law as a mode
of land use control is suggested by the discussion in Part III infra.
Public nuisance law seems to be particularly appropriate for prohibiting certain conduct that is offensive to the public interest. Beyond
this, however, it is perhaps equally important that individuals who
suffer special injury from a public nuisance may bring private actions
against such nuisances, 14 and public nuisance law thereby provides
a mechanism for protecting individuals injured by governmental policy
decisions not to enforce the law, which might otherwise leave them
with no remedy for their injury."
A major advantage offered by both private and public nuisance is
the fl~xibility inherent in the remedies which- are available. In many
land Use disputes, damages are appropriate but preventive remedies
are not. When individuals appeal from decisions of-zoning authorities,
they must challenge the authority or appropriateness of such decisions,
thus leaving the courts with the choice between authorizing or pro14. See notes 304-308 and accompanying text, infra.
15. A person might bring an action to contest an administrative decision relating to
zoning or pollution control, but the standing requirements and procedural problems would
probably be more severe than in nuisance actions. See Peck, Standing Requirements for
Obtiaining Review of Governmental Action in Washington, 35 WAsir. L. REV. 362 (1960);
Comment, The "Aggrieved Person?' Requirement in Zoning, 8 Wx. & ARy L. REV. 294
(1967).
.
.
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hibiting a land use by deciding to uphold or reject the administrative
decision. In such cases, no balancing of monetary interests is possible.
But with nuisance actions, such a balancing or compensating is possible by awarding damages but not injunctive relief, leaving the
decision as to permissible uses to be made by the public authorities
on the basis of the dominant public interest.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the Washington law of
nuisance, to abstract and analyze the principles thereof and the factors
which affect judicial decisions in nuisance cases, to suggest reliance
on nuisance law as a mode of resolving certain types of land use
control problems, and to suggest modification and development of
nuisance law which will contribute toward an integrated system of
land use control, with nuisance law operating as a part of that
system. While the primary focus is on Washington law, general common law principles are noted for comparative purposes.
I. PRIVATE NUISANCE
A. The Concept of Private Nuisance
1. Development of the Concept of Private Nuisance
The earliest actions for private nuisance were recognized in the
twelfth or thirteenth century by the assize of nuisance, which provided
16.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

or TORTS ch. 40 (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) is generally

cited for comparative purposes. One reason for this is its recent date of preparation, which
makes it one of the most current general works on nuisance. A second reason is its
extensive notes, comments, and case citations, which make it a valuable research tool.
The following general works on torts probably have the best recent discussions of
nuisance law: W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 87-92 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; 1 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS

§§ 1.23-1.30 (1956)

[hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]. Several English texts are

also useful: R. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 5 (14th ed. 1965); J.
FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 18 (3d ed. 1965); H. STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS

ch. 11 (3d ed. 1963). Three older treatises may also have limited usefulness. They are:
J. JOYCE AND H. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING NUISANCES (1906) [hereinafter
cited as JOYCE]; E. GARRETT AND H. GARRETT, THE LAW OF NUISANCES (3d ed. 1908)
[hereinafter cited as GARRETT]; H.

WOOD,

A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

NUISANCES (2d ed. 1883) [hereinafter cited as WOOD]. A practical treatment of Washington nuisance law from the perspective of municipalities is found in: E. CAMPBELL, G.
SMITH AND H.

OLSON, NUISANCES-THEIR

CONTROL AND ABATEMENT IN THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON (1949). For discussions of nuisance law in states neighboring Washington,
see Yerke, The Law of Nuisance in Oregon, 1 Wi.AM. L.J. 289 (1960); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 52-101 to 52-410 (1948).
A review of these authorities indicates that although some aspects of Washington's
nuisance statutes and decisional law appear to be unique, in general the basic principles
of Washington law are fairly representative of most jurisdictions.

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
the remedies of damages and abatement for certain disturbances of
freeholds not constituting disseisin.lT In the fifteenth century, the action on the case for nuisance superseded the assize and limited the legal
remedy to damages, thus requiring plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief
from the equity courts in order to prevent disturbances. 8
Blackstone defines private nuisance as "anything done to the hurt
or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another."' 9
While this definition reflects the basic concept of nuisance held by
the common law courts," it is overgeneralized to a degree which prevents it from being particularly useful.2 1 Of course, overgeneralization is probably necessary because of the common law courts' extreme
sensitivity to the circumstances surrounding each nuisance case they
considered. As stated by Thesiger, L.J., in 1879:22
Whether anything is a nuisance or not, is a question to be
determined not merely by an abstract consideration of the thing
itself, but in reference to its circumstances.
This approach to deciding cases led one early American author to

conclude :23
It is not practicable to give other than a general definition of
what constitutes a nuisance. A precise, technical definition, applicable at all times to all cases, cannot be given because of the varying circumstances upon which the decisions are based . . .The
only approximately accurate method of determining the meaning
of the term nuisance is to examine the cases adjudicating what
are and are not nuisances.
Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in attempting to define

17. J.FLEmrNG, THE LAW oP ToRTs 365 (3d ed. 1965); RESTATZUENT
or ToRaS § 821D, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969).

(SEcoND)

18. See note 17, supra.
19. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, ComMENTARrES *216.
20.

See L. CAVE, ADDISON oN THE LAw or ToRTs 332 (5th ed. 1879). For cases

applying this and similar definitions, see JOYCE, supra note 16, at 16-17 n.25. Early
American cases frequently quoted Blackstone's definition. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMIx.ENTA1U-S 296 (W. Hammond ed. 1890).
21. See WOOD, supra note 16, at 17, where the author concludes that:
[The] definition is incomplete, and in some respects misleading, as it is now well
settled that neither mere hurt, or [sic]
mere inconvenience, necessarily makes the use
of property producing those results a nuisance ....
22. Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879). A number of English opinions to the
same effect are quoted by GAPrr, supra note 16, at 6 nn.2,3; 7 nn.2,4; 9 n.2.
23. JOYCE, suP-a note 16, at 1.
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private nuisance, many commentators, courts, and legislatures have
persisted in the effort, with the result that there are numerous general
definitions to be found. 24 The necessity of overgeneralization in such
definitions is revealed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tentative Draft), which states: 2 5
A private nuisance is a non-trespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.
It is useful to note that this definition (1) defines nuisance in terms
of the effect of conduct, that is, an invasion and (2) limits the invaded
rights to interests in land.2"
2. The Washington Concept of Private Nuisance
In Washington, a statute provides :27
Nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to
perform a duty, which act or omission either annoys, injures or
endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of others, offends
decency, or unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to
obstruct, or render dangerous for passage, any lake or navigable
river, bay, stream, canal or basin, or any public park, square,
street or highway; or in any way renders other persons insecure
in life, or in the use of property.
A private nuisance is any nuisance other than "one which affects
equally the rights of an entire community or neighborhood....
The Washington court has held that the statutory definition of

24.

JOYCE, supra note 16, at ch. 1; WOOD, supra note 16, at ch. 1; H. STREET, THE

LAW OF TORTS 215 (3d ed. 1963).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969); see also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (Tent. Draft No. 15,
a, b. R. HEUSTON, SALmOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS 84 (14th ed. 1965)

1969), comments
states:
Nuisance is really a field of tortious liability rather than a single type of tortious
conduct: the feature which gives it unity is the interest invaded-that of the use
and enjoyment of land.
See PROSSER § 90; H. STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 212, 215 (3d ed. 1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A, comments b, c (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969); note 201 and
accompanying text, infra; but see Note, Nuisance-PersonalAnnoyance as Sole Injury,
55 MICH. L. REV. 310 (1956).
27. WASr. REv. CODE § 7.48.120 (1957).
28. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.48.130, 7.48.150 (1957).

Nuisance ds aLand Use Control
nuisance is broader than the common law concept, and has construed
this to mean that relief may be granted in some cases where it would
not have been granted at common law;2 9 however, the court has
exercised caution in relying on general definitions to decide cases, 0
and renders its decisions by placing heavy weight on the circumstances surrounding each case. 1 This approach results in a judicial
balancing of the various interests asserted in each case, as indicated
in the following statement:32
Our basic point of inquiry relates to the general theory of the
law of nuisance. This appears primarily to be based upon generally accepted ideas of right, equity, and justice. The thought
is inherent that not even a fee simple owner has a totality of
rights in and with respect to his real property. In so far as the
law of nuisance is concerned, rights as to the usage of land are
relative. The general legal principle to be inferred from court
action in nuisance cases is that one landowner will not be permitted to use his land so unreasonably as to interfere unreasonably with another landowner's use and enjoyment of his land.

29. Champa'v. Washington Compressed Gas. Co., 146 Wash. 190, 197, 262 P. 228,
230 (1927), states:
Regardless of the theory of the law in other jurisdictions, . . because of our
statute, we have long held that the common-law definition and consequent remedy
for a private nuisance is enlarged.
Ferry v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 648, 200 P. 336 (1921), rehearing 116 Wash. 661, 664, 203
P. 40, 41 (1921); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 49-50, 111 P. 879, 881 (1910).
30. Thornton v, Dow, 60 Wash. 622, 635, 111 P. 899 (1910), quoting CooLEY ON
TORTS 672 (2d ed. 1888), states:
An attempt to classify nuisances is, therefore, almost equivalent to an attempt to
classify the infinite variety of ways in which one may be annoyed or impeded in
the enjoyment of his rights. It is very seldom, indeed, that a definition of a nuisance
has been attempted, for the reason that, to make it sufficiently comprehensive, it is
necessary to make it so general that it is likely to define nothing.
31. Crawford v. Central Steam Laundry, 78 Wash. 355, 357, 139 P. 56, 57 (1914)
concludes that:
The precise degree of discomfort that must be produced to constitute a lawful
business a nuisance . . . cannot be definitely stated. No fixed rule can be given that
will be applicable to all cases. Each case must therefore depend largely upon its
own facts .... Every person has a right to do with his own property as he sees
fit so long as he does not invade the rights of his neighbor unreasonably, judged by
the ordinary standards of life, according to the notions and habits of people of
ordinary sensibilities and simple tastes.
See Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wn. 2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964); Park v. Stolzhefse, 24
Wn. 2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946); Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of
the World, 61 Wash. 230, 112 P. 255 (1910).
32. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 254, 248 P.2d 380, 382
(1952). See Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964); Morin v. Johnson,
49 Wn. 2d 275, 300 P.2d 569 (1956).
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B. Actionable Private Nuisances in Washington
A Washington statute provides that:" s
[W]hatever is injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of the life
and property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action for
damages and other further relief.
This statutory recognition of a cause of action for essential interference, in context with the court's recognition of unreasonable interferences as causes of action, results in the proposition that for purposes
of analysis, an actionable private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a property or small number of properties caused by an
unreasonable use of other property.3 4 Causation and the defenses of
33. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.010 (1957).
34. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 254, 248 P.2d 380, 382
(1952) suggests the importance and dominance of this concept:
The crux of the matter appears to be reasonableness. Admittedly the term is a
flexible one. It has many shades and varieties of meaning. In a nuisance case the
fundamental inquiry always appears to be whether the use of certain land can be
considered as reasonable in relation to all the facts and surrounding circumstances.
Application of the doctrine of nuisance requires a balancing of rights, interests and
convenience.
See notes 26, 28, 31, 32, 33 and accompanying text, supra.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939) applies the standard of unreasonableness to
intentional conduct which results in a nuisance. Subsequent sections then provide an
analytic framework for evaluating unreasonableness. Section 826 provides:
An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is
unreasonable . . . unless the utility of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of
the harm.
In evaluating the gravity of the harm, § 827 states that the following factors are to be
"considered":
(a) the extent of the harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value which the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the
locality;
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
As to the utility of the defendant's conduct, § 828 states that the following factors are
"important":
(a) social value which the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct;
(b) suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality;
(c) impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 829-831 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§§

OF TORTS

826-831 (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969).
The RESTATEMENT'S discussion of unreasonableness is applied only to invasions which

are "intentional" and not to invasions which are "negligent or reckless" or "actionable
under the rules governing liability for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OP TORTS § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969). For some purposes,

analysis of a case requires that these differences in types of cases be considered, e.g., as
to whether contributory negligence constitutes a defense; but the courts generally obscure

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
adverse possession, contributory negligence and assumption of risk
must be considered when nuisance actions are brought; 8 5 however,
unreasonable interference and unreasonable use are the basic analytic
elements of nuisance law. 6

these differences as to types of conduct. Therefore, this comment applies the unreasonableness analysis to all types of conduct, and it is suggested that negligence, recklessness,
and abnormally dangerous activity are particular aspects of a basic analysis of the
"unreasonableness" test. See RESTATEMNT (SECOND) or ToRTs § 822, comments h, i
(Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969); HARPER & JAmsES at 69, 71-72. A rigid application of the
RESTATEmExT'S formula may result in substantial injustice to injured plaintiffs whose
cases do not clearly fall into the RESTATEmENT'S categories. See Note, Air Pollution as a
Private Nuisance, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 134 (1967).
Analysis of the principles of nuisance law takes the perspective of the types and degree
of interference complained of, and this comment makes no attempt to identify particular
land uses which have been adjudicated nuisances. Such listings may be found in 9 WAsz.
DIG. Nuisance § 3 (1954); 39 Amx. Jun. Nuisances §§ 47-116 (1942); 66 C.J.S. Nuisances
§§ 27-75 (1950).
35. At least one Washington case suggests that cause in fact must be proved by the
plaintiff, but not proximate or legal cause. See Forbus v. Knight, 24 Wn. 2d 297, 311-12,
163 P.2d 822, 829 (1945). REsTATEmEN (SECOND) or ToRTS § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 15,
1969) states that "legal cause" is required. The concept of "legal cause" is a general
tort concept of infinite complexity and will not be discussed herein. See RESTATE ENT
(SECOND) Or TORTS §§ 279-280, 430-462 (1965); PRossER ch. 9. Many of the policy
considerations which probably determine whether a court will apply the concept to deny
recovery are discussed herein under other headings, and the inability to find cases decided
on the rationale of proximate or legal cause suggests that it is more appropriate to discuss these policies under such other headings. In the case of nuisance law, there is probably
little reason for the courts to apply proximate cause reasoning because they are free to
consider virtually any matter when balancing the unreasonableness of the interference
with the plaintiff's property against the reasonableness of the defendant's use of his
property. See notes 37-128 and accompanying text, infra.
Clearly, "the right to maintain a public nuisance cannot be acquired by prescription."
Elves v. King County, 49 Wn. 2d 201, 202, 299 P.2d 206 (1956). See D'Ambrosia v. Acme
Packing & Provision Co., 179 Wash. 405, 37 P.2d 887 (1934); Bales v. Tacoma, 172
Wash. 494, 20 P.2d 860 (1933); WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.190 (1957). But the court has
suggested a contrary rule as to private nuisances. See Diking Dist. No. 2 v. Calispel
Duck Club, 11 Wn. 2d 131, 118 P.2d 780 (1941). However, it would seem that in most
cases, a plaintiff could successfully argue that the defendant had not satisfied the requirements for establishing adverse possession or prescription. See Stoebuck, The Law of
Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WAsr. L. REv. 53 (1960).
Contributory negligence constitutes a defense in nuisance actions only where the
defendant's negligence is the cause of the resulting nuisance. Albin v. National Bank of
Commerce, 60 Wn. 2d 745, 375 P.2d 487 (1962); Owens v. Seattle, 49 Wn 2d 187,
299 P.2d 460 (1956); see RESTATEM NT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840B (Tent. Draft
No. 15, 1969); Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Rv. 997, 1023-27
(1966); Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 984 (1952); Comment, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk
as Defense, 28 TENN.L. Rev. 561 (1961).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 840C (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) states that
assumption of risk is a defense to nuisance actions to the same extent as in other tort
actions. Contra, HARPER & JAmES at 83. No Washington cases on this point have been
found, and it seems that the defense has little utility in view of the Washington court's'
position that "coming to the nuisance" does not necessarily constitute a defense. See notes
114-117 and accompanying text, infra.
36. See note 32 and accompanying text, supra.
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1. Unreasonable Interference
(a) Types of Interference. (1) Depreciation of Property Value.
The Washington court has held that depreciation of property value is
not sufficient by itself to constitute a cause of action for private
nuisance.17 Even so, diminution of property value should be alleged
in any case in which it can be proved," since the court tends to place
considerable weight on this factor if the accompanying allegations of
other types of interference are somewhat tenuous and difficult of
proof.3 9 The importance of reduced property value is also suggested
by the numerous opinions which state that there was such a reduction, even though it was not a salient factor in the ratio decidendi of
the court, 0 and the occasional references to the plaintiff's failure to
show such a reduction when the court has concluded that there was no
cause of action."1
(2) Physical Invasion of Property. Physical invasion of property
may constitute a trespass; 42 however, such an invasion may also
result in a nuisance.43 In some factual situations there may be a
nuisance without there being an actionable trespass,44 and the courts
have probably recognized nuisance as a theory by which they can
balance the interests in borderline physical invasion cases.4 r En37. Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn. 2d 275, 282, 300 P.2d 569, 573 (1956); Rea v. Tacoma
Mausoleum Ass'n, 103 Wash. 429, 174 P. 961 (1918). See Tarr v. Hopewell Community
Club, 153 Wash. 214, 217, 279 P. 594, 595 (1929) ; Crawford v. Central Steam Laundry,
78 Wash. 355, 357, 139 P. 56, 57 (1914); State ex rel. Warner v. Hayes Investment Co.,
13 Wn. 2d 306, 314, 125 P.2d 262, 265 (1942) (public nuisance case).
38. Most cases where other types of interference can be proved, i.e., physical invasion,
harm or fear of harm to persons, or discomfort or inconvenience, will present a fact
pattern in which diminution of the market value of property can also be proved.
Physical deterioration, functional obsolescence or economic obsolescence will result in the
decrease in value. See Comment, Valuation of Real Property-Role of the Expert Witness,
44 WASH. L. REV. 687, 697 (1969) and sources cited therein.
39. See Drake v. Smith, 54 Wn. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 1059 (1959); Turtle v. Fitchett, 156
Wash. 328, 332, 287 P. 7, 8-9 (1930) ; Ferry v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 648, 200 P. 336 (1921),
rehearing 116 Wash. 661, 664, 203 P. 40, 41 (1921); Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash.
437, 441, 184 P. 220, 222 (1919).
40. See Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 202, 248 P.2d 408, 410 (1952); Grant
v. Rosenburg, 112 Wash. 361, 364, 192 P. 889, 890 (1920), rehearing 112 Wash. 368,
196 P. 626 (1920); Lavner v. Independent Light & Water Co., 74 Wash. 373, 374, 133
P. 592, 593 (1913); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 48-49, 111 P. 879, 880 (1910).
41. See Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 20, 129 P.2d 536,
539 (1942); Zey v. Town of Long Beach, 144 Wash. 582, 584, 258 P. 492, 493 (1927).
42. See generally PROSSER § 13; HARPER & JAMES §§ 1.1-1.22; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
or TORTS chs. 7, 8 (1965).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 821D (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969); cases
cited in note 46, infra.
44. See notes 309-313 and accompanying text, infra.
45. Id.
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croachments of artificial structures and natural objects are generally treated as nuisances, whether they are intentional or accidental. 46 Substances invading property via air or water may also
constitute private nuisances,4 7 although the court may carefully weigh
other factors before concluding that a particular invasion is actionable.48 A potential invasion which is reasonably certain to occur is
sufficient to support a cause of action.4 9
(3) Harm and Fear of Harm to Persons. The Washington court
has construed the Washington statutes to confer a cause of action for
reasonable fear of harm to persons.5 0 Most of the cases recognizing
such a cause of action are grounded on the plaintiff's fear that the
defendant's use of his property will create exposure to diseases that
would not otherwise exist,51 but fears of other harmful events have
also been recognized. 2 In early cases, it was suggested that a reasonable fear did not necessarily mean one supportable by scientific evidence," but the application of this principle has been seriously eroded
by suggestions that the reasonableness of the fear may be determined
by reference to general public beliefs,5 4 probabilities based on the

46. Peterson v. King County, 45 Wn. 2d 860, 278 P.2d 774 (1954) (earth slide);
Forbus v. Knight, 24 Wn. 2d 297, 163 P.2d 822 (1945) (tree roots); First Methodist
Episcopal Church v. Barr, 123 Wash. 425, 212 P. 546 (1923) (encroachment of wall);
Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 P. 298 (1921) (tree branches); see Note, Trespass
or Nuisance, 23 MoD. L. Rav. 188 (1960).
47. Air-borne substances: Riblet v. Spokand-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249,
248 P.2d 380 (1952); Weller v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 155 Wash. 526, 285 P.
446 (1930); Ehorn v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 131 Wash. 270; 230 P. 419 (1924);
Sterrett v. Northport Mining and Smelting Co., 30 Wash. 164, 70 P. 266 (1902); see
Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollution, 10 ARiz. L.
REv. 107 (1968).
Water-borne substances: Drake v. Smith, 54 Wn. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 1059 (1959);
Haveman v. Beulow, 36 Wn. 2d 185, 217 P.2d 313 (1950); Bowman v. Helser, 143 Wash.
397, 255 P. 146 (1927).
48. See Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 P. 306 (1924); compare
Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952) with
Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
49. Cf. Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash. 328, 287 P. 7 (1930).
50. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 53, 111 P. 879, 881 (1910); Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 61 Wash. 230, 112 P. 255 (1910).
51. See cases cited in notes 49-50, supra; see also Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437,
184 P. 220 (1919).
52. Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946); Ferry v. Seattle,
116 Wash. 648, 200 P. 336 (1921), rehearing 116 Wash. 661, 203 P. 40 (1921).

53. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910).
54. See Clark v. Sunset Hils Memorial Park, Inc., 45 Wn. 2d 180, 191-92, 273
P.2d 645, 651 (1954); Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 103 Wash. 429, 436, 174
P. 961, 963 (1918).
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evidence,5 5 the existence of related physical invasions,5" or even legislation. 7 Undoubtedly, these limitations on the rule as originally stated
were made necessary by conjectural and imaginary apprehensions
alleged in some cases,58 and the subjective nature of allegations of
such fears and the court's cautious reaction to such allegations make
it extremely difficult to predict the outcome of any particular case.
Nevertheless, the cases discussing fear of harm suggest that it is a
significant factor weighing in favor of the plaintiff.
(4) Discomfort and Inconvenience. Some Washington cases have
stated that there will be no recovery for nuisance based on discomfort
and inconvenience alone,5 9 but the court has also stated that a property
owner is entitled to "mental quiet as well as physical comfort."' There
is some suggestion that this apparent inconsistency is based on a
distinction between severe discomfort and mere unpleasantness, the
distinction thus being a matter of degree, 6 but an analysis of the
cases suggests the general rule is that no action will lie for discomfort
and inconvenience alone.62 This conclusion is based on the fact that
the opinions upholding a cause of action based partially on discomfort
and inconvenience have also been substantially grounded on other
types of interference.63 Accordingly, it is probably wise to allege discomfort and inconvenience in any case where they are present, but
other types of interference should also be pleaded. This would not seem
55. See Clark v. Sunset Hills Memorial Park, Inc., 45 Wn. 2d 180, 191, 273 P.2d 645,
651 (1954); Aubol v. Tacoma, 167 Wash. 442, 445-46, 9 P.2d 780, 781 (1932); Hite v.
Cashmere Cemetery Ass'n, 158 Wash. 421, 424, 290 P. 1008, 1009 (1930), noted in
6 WASH. L. REv. 89 (1931).
56. See Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 103 Wash. 429, 437, 174 P. 961, 963
(1918); Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 442, 184 P. 220, 222 (1919).
57. See Aubol v. Tacoma, 167 Wash. 442, 445-46, 9 P.2d 780, 781 (1932).
58. See Hughes v. McVay, 113 Wash. 333, 194 P. 565 (1920).
59. Tarr v. Hopewell Community Club, 153 Wash. 214, 217, 279 P. 594, 595 (1929);
Zey v. Long Beach, 144 Wash. 582, 584, 258 P. 492, 493 (1927); Hughson v. Wingham,
120 Wash. 327, 330, 207 P. 2, 3 (1922).
60. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 51, 111 P. 879, 880-81 (1910).
61. See Zey v. Long Beach, 144 Wash. 582, 258 P. 492 (1927); Hughson v. Wingham,
120 Wash. 327, 207 P. 2 (1922).
62. This generalization is subject to at least one limitation. Fear of physical harm
will probably be sufficient, by itself, to sustain a nuisance action, and it should therefore
be distinguished from discomfort and inconvenience, as the terms are used here. See
notes 50-58 and accompanying text, supra.
63. See Drake v. Smith, 54 Wn. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 1059 (1959); Riblet v. SpokanePortland Cement Co., 45 Wn. 2d 346, 274 P.2d 574 (1954); Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn.
2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952); Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash. 328, 287 P. 7 (1930),
noted in 5 WASH. L. REV. 132 (1930); Lavner v. Independent Light & Water Co.,
74 Wash. 373, 133 P. 592 (1913) ; Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910).
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to pose a serious difficulty in most cases since appreciable discomfort
or inconvenience would almost always be accompanied by other types
of interference.64
Offensive odors and sounds are recognized as causes of discomfort,
and an allegation of their occurrence generally has the same impact
as an allegation of discomfort.6 5 The court generally considers the
offensiveness of odors without requiring proof of "discomfort"; 6 6 but
the offensiveness of sounds seems to present more difficulty, with the
court appearing to pay more attention to the subjective reactions7
of persons to sounds in deciding whether they create a nuisance.
The Washington court has stated that unsightliness does not constitute a ground for establishing a cause of action for nuisance; 68
however, some opinions indicate that the court considered offensive
visual stimuli in arriving at the conclusion that a nuisance existed. 9

64. Discomfort and inconvenience are frequently accompanied by fear of physical
harm and are quite often caused by a physical invasion of substances onto the plaintiff's
property, e.g., air or water pollutants. In almost any case, however, discomfort and
inconvenience will result in a depredation of property value. See note 38, supra. See
also cases cited in note 63, supra.
65. See notes 59-64 and accompanying text, supra.
66. See Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964); Haveman v. Beulow,
36 Wn. 2d 185, 217 P.2d 313 (1950); Asia v. Pool, 47 Wash. 515, 92 P. 351 (1907);
State v. Primeau, 70 Wn. 2d 109, 422 P.2d 302 (1966) (public nuisance); but see
Grant v. Rosenburg, 121 Wash. 361, 192 P. 889 (1920) rehearing 112 Wash. 368, 196
P. 626 (1920) (odors found to cause nausea and vomiting).
Physiological and psychological aspects of olfaction suggest the need for more
liberal treatment of offensive smells than for offensive noises or unsightliness.
C. BuTnR, NEuROPSYCHOLOGY: THE STuDY or BRAN AND BEHAVIOR 86 (1968) states:
Whereas many sights and sounds are motivationally neutral, our first and often
primary reaction to tastes and smells [is] evaluative. They are typically judged
as either "good," "bad," or "indifferent." These behavioral observations are
consistent with the anatomical connections of the olfactory and taste systems . . .
the afferent pathways of both these senses project to a part of the forebrain
involved in motivational processes and arousal.
67. See Bruskland v. Oak Theater, Inc., 42 Wn. 2d 346, 254 P.2d 1035 (1953);
Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wn. 2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944); Haan v. Heath, 161 Wash. 128,
296 P. 816 (1931); Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83 P. 14 (1905); cf. Deaconess
Hospital v. Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn. 2d 378, 407 n.6, 403 P.2d 54, 71 n.5 (1965).
Vibrations of greater magnitude than sounds are probably subject to the same
treatment as sounds. See Ridpath v. Spokane Stamp Works, 48 Wash. 320, 93 P. 416

(1908).

68. Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wn. 2d 929, 938, 395 P.2d 183, 189 (1964). This
seems to reflect the general rule. See Note, Aesthetic Nuisances in Florida, 14 U. FL.A. L.
REv. 54, 55 (1961), where the writer concludes:
[W]hen a mere eyesore restricts the complete use and enjoyment of property and
decreases its value, most courts retreat from their normal indignation at nauseous
smells and sleep-robbing noises.
69. See Bruskland v. Oak Theater, Inc., 42 Wn. 2d 346, 351, 254 P.2d 1035, 1036
(1953); Haan v. Heath, 161 Wash. 128, 130, 296 P. 816, 817 (1931).
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The court has also recognized that the offensive nature of a defendant's
conduct may depend upon an interrelationship between various sensory
experiences, including vision.70
It is difficult to rationalize the distinction between visual and other
types of sensory stimuli. All sensory systems have the same physiological basis: they function as transducers which transfer energy of
various forms, e.g., light, vibration and molecular structure, into nerve
impulses which are transmitted to nerve centers such as the brain.7
The physiological and psychological responses and feelings generated
by various types of stimuli may differ somewhat, but they are not
distinguishable by any criteria that would suggest that visual stimuli
have a less direct effect on human feelings and responses or that
visual perception is so much more complex than that resulting from
the other senses that it should be treated with more caution in legal
analysis.72 In short, visual perception is not materially different from
other types, and for purposes of legal actions, there is no physiological
or psychological basis for distinguishing it from other types.
It appears that the basic reasons for the reluctance of the courts

70. See State v. Primeau, 70 Wn. 2d 109, 114, 422 P.2d 302, 305 (1966) (public
nuisance case).
71. Humans have sensory receptors of various types, which are sensitive to various
types of energy. Of those which are of particular interest here, the olfactory bulb and
related structures respond to certain molecular structures. See L. WOODBURNE, THE
NEURAL BASIS OF BEHAVIOR ch. 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WOODBUIu];
J. DEUTSCH AND D. DEUTSCH, PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOr.OGY ch. 12 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as DEUTSCH]. The organ of Corti and related structures respond to certain
vibrations in the air. See WOODBURNE ch. 13; DEUTSCH ch. 10. The retina and
related structures respond to certain types of light. See WOODBUIi E ch. 14; DEUTSCH
ch. 11. There are, of course, other sensory receptors, such as those sensitive to pressure,
heat, and cold, and they perform the same basic transducer function as smell, hearing,
and vision. See WOODBURNE ch. 5; DEUTSCH ch. 8.
The receptor organs transform the energy to which they are sensitive into electrochemical energy to which neurons in the nervous system will respond. See WOODBURNE
66-70; M. GORDON, ANIMAL FUNCTION: PRINCIPLES AND ADAPTATIONS ch. 9 (1968).
Neurons respond to the electrochemical stimulus and transmit impulses through nerve
fibers to various nerve centers, including parts of the brain. The general location and
functioning of areas in the brain which integrate and control responses to sensory
input are not well understood; however, it is fairly safe to say that of the three types
of sensory input discussed herein, olfaction is the least understood. See DEUTSCH 378.
Vision is at least as well understood as audition. See C. BUTLER, NEuRoPSYCOLOGY:
THE STUDY OF BRAIN AND BEHAVIOR 40, 58 (1968); De Valois, Neural Processing
of Visual Information, in FRONTIERS IN PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY ch. 3 (R. Russell ed.
1966).
72. Probably the most significant distinction between vision and the other two
senses of primary interest herein (audition and olfaction) is that human beings are
considerably more dependent upon vision than the others. See WOODBURm 193;
C. BUTTER, NUROPSYCHOLOGY: THE STUDY OF BRAIN AND BEHAvIOR 39 (1968).
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to recognize offensive visual stimuli as bases for nuisance actions are:
(1) the association of visual stimuli with aesthetics, and the notion
that one person does not have a right to impose his aesthetic values
on another" and (2) the fear that the recognition of visual stimuli as
an element of a cause of action will lead to petty actions based on
different tastes rather than substantial injuries. 7' As to the first reason,
there is no closer connection between vision and aesthetics than that
of any other sensory system,7 5 and in cases where other courts have
recognized visual stimuli as proper for consideration, the cases actually
involved the suppression of "ugliness" rather than the imposition of
aesthetic "tastes." 70 While "ugliness" and "taste" may not reflect a
73. Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wn. 2d 929, 938, 395 P.2d 183, 189 (1964) cites
several cases supporting the proposition: "That a thing is unsightly or offends the
aesthetic sense of a neighbor, does not ordinarily make it a nuisance.. . ." The court
does not elaborate on the reasoning of the cited opinions, but mentions that one of
them "holds that the mere fact that a thing is unsightly, and thus offends the
aesthetic sense, furnishes no valid ground for a declaration by the legislature that it
is a nuisance." Id. The Washington court strongly suggests that it would not follow this
holding as applied to a statutory declaration of nuisance, but does follow the reasoning
as applied to the plaintiff's contention of an "unreasonable interference" with his
land. Id. at 938-39. A rather curious statement in the opinion follows the discussion
summarized above: "As we have made clear, we are not here concerned with the
enforcement of a zoning ordinance or with an area that is residential in character.
We see no reason for the intervention of equity on this phase of the case." Id. at 939.
This statement suggests that the unsightliness was merely insuficient, when weighed
against other factors in the case, to warrant injunctive relief or a conclusion of

unreasonable interference caused by an unreasonable use; thus permitting an interpre-

tation of the case concluding that offensive visual stimuli may be a basis for a cause
of action in a nuisance case. The reference to injunctive relief suggests that the court
may adopt a different rule in damage actions, in view of the more strict requirements
for injunctive relief than for damages.
74. This is essentially a restatement of the notion that offensive visual stimuli offend
the aesthetic sense. See note 76, infra.
75. Any sensory system, but at least olfaction, audition and vision, may be the
basis of an aesthetic experience. See Note, Aesthetic Nuisances in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L.
Rxv. 54, 60 (1961); note 76, infra.
76. See Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CoRNELL L.Q. 1 (1939); Note,
Aesthetic Nuisances in Florida, 14 U. FiA. L. Ray. 54 (1961); Note, Nuisance Based
on Aesthetic Considerations, 17 MID. L. Rav. 345 (1957); Note, Nuisance-Aesthetic
Grounds Held Valid for Injunctive Relief Against Lawful Business, 59 W. VA. L. Rv.
92 (1956).

For discussions of offensive lights as nuisances, see Note, Light as Constituting

Nuisance, 1 ArA. L. REV. 314 (1949); Note, Light as a Private Nuisance, 2 OKLA. L.
REV. 259 (1949).
When the term "aesthetic" is used, its inherent ambiguity obscures the issue facing
the court. WEas~r's THmn NEw ITERNATiOiNAL DicnToNARY (1961) reveals this
ambiguity quite clearly, as can be seen by observing two of the alternative definitions
of "aesthetic." One of these states: "relating to the beautiful as distinguished from the
merely pleasing . . . artistic . . . beautiful." The other is: "relating to sensuous
cognition: involving pure feeling or sensation . . . in contrast to ratiocination . . .
based on or derived from 'immediate . . . sensuous experience." When the latter sense
of the term is meant, any evaluative reaction to stimuli would be appropriately

65

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 47, 1970

legal distinction which is of great value, the problem of subjective
valuation which concerns the court in the case of visual stimuli is
also applicable to other types of stimuli and should not suffice to justify
different treatment of vision. The fear that the courts will be forced
to entertain petty actions is likewise without merit. The courts are
not required to recognize any and all offensive stimuli of any nonvisual or visual type as sufficient to constitute a nuisance; and as a
practical matter, offensive stimuli alone are virtually never sufficient
to sustain a cause of action 1
Visual stimuli seem to fall within the language of the Washington
nuisance statutes 7 8 and the courts have recognized visual stimuli as
appropriate considerations for legislative and administrative land use
control decisions. 79 Such stimuli are also recognized in resolving certain
traditional types of judicial problems, such as proof of market value.80
With the increasing tendency of courts and legislatures to acknowledge
visual stimuli as the basis of certain types of land use controls, it is
quite possible that the Washington court will be increasingly responsive to allegations of unsightliness in actions for private nuisance.
Such stimuli should be given the same weight as that given any other
type of offensive stimuli in nuisance cases.8'
(b) Degrees of Unreasonableness. (1) Substantiality of Interference. The interference with the plaintiff's property must be unreasonencompassed by the term. When the former is intended, only "beautiful" or positively
valued stimuli are included within the meaning of the term. In nuisance cases, the
courts which use the term "aesthetic" apparently intend the concept of beauty or
positive values; yet nuisance actions nearly always involve offensive stimuli. In any
event, it is clear that either concept of "aesthetic" is equally applicable to sights,
sounds, smells, or other types of sensory stimuli. See note 75, supra.
77. Note, Aesthetic Nuisances in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. Rav. 54, 60 (1961) suggests:
It has been pointed out that the difficulties of setting an objective standard as to
what degree of noise or odor is sufficient to annoy substantially the ordinary
person are hardly greater than in the case of an eyesore. These difficulties have
not kept courts from declaring offenses to the nose or ears to be nuisances.
See notes 50, 53 and accompanying text, supra.
78. See notes 27, 33, supra, 233-237 and accompanying text, infra. A statute which
deals specifically with offensive visual stimuli is WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.66.060 (1967).
79. See Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968);
See also Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328
(1964); Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); In re Opinion of the Justices,
103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); Comment, Aesthetic Control of Land Use; A House
Built upon the Sand?, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1964).
80. The appearance of property and its surroundings is a basic factor considered in
valuing it. See generally Comment, Valuation of Real Property: Role of the Expert
Witness, 44 WAsH. L. RFv. 687 (1969).
81. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text, supra.

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
able in order for it to amount to a nuisance.

2

For certain types of

interference, such as encroachments, virtually any interference may be
considered so unreasonable as to constitute a nuisance.8 3 But for most

types, including physical invasions by substances via air or water and
offensive stimuli, the interference must be substantial to confer a cause
of action,84 but it need not be continuous. 5 Fear of harm to persons

must be reasonable to sustain an action; however, the cases generally
approach this fact determination from the point of view of the plaintiff, and once he alleges his fear, that allegation will probably fail only

upon the trial court's affirmative determination that the fear was unreasonable. 88
(2) Sensibilities of the OrdinaryPerson. In determining whether an
interference is substantial enough to be actionable as a nuisance, the
court has applied
the standard of the "person of ordinary and normal
sensibilities 8 7 in order to avoid extreme claims for "every trifling
or imaginary annoyance, such as may offend the taste or disturb the
nerves of a fastidious or overrefined person."8 8 While this standard
is useful in physical invasion nuisance cases involving pollution,8 9 it
is undoubtedly necessary in cases where discomfort or fear of harm
to persons is alleged.Y0 Where depreciation of the value of property is
claimed, the substantiality of such depreciation is determined indi82. See note 34 and accompanying text, supra.

RESTATEWMENT

(SEcoND)

or TORTS

§ 821F. (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) requires "substantial harm" for liability.

83. See Forbus v. Knight, 24 Wn. 2d 297, 163 P.2d 822 (1945); Gostina v. Ryland,
116 Wash. 228, 199 P. 298 (1921).
84. Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn. 2d 275, 300 P.2d 569 (1956); Bartel v. Ridgefield
Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 P. 306 (1924) (invasions of substances by air). For
other types of interference, see notes 37-70 and accompanying text, supra.
85. Wilcox v. Henry, 35 Wash. 591, 77 P. 1055 (1904); cf. Ames Lake Community
Club v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 769, 775, 420 P.2d 363, 367 (1966).
86. See Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d 781, 797-801, 167 P.2d 412, 420-22 (1946);
Ferry v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 648, 200 P. 336 (1921), rehearing 116 Wash 661, 662-63,
203 P. 40, 41-42 (1921); Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World,
61 Wash. 230, 112 P. 255 (1910) ; Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910);
notes 50-58 and accompanying text, supra.
87. Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 57 Wn. 2d 619, 622, 358 P.2d 975, 977 (1961);
see Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910); see also RESTATEMIENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821F (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) ("normal" person test).
88. Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 61 Wash. 230,
232-33, 112 P. 255, 256 (1910), quoting Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294, 97 Am. Dec.

654 (1868).

89. See, e.g., Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 57 Wn. 2d 619, 358 P.2d 975 (1961).
90. See Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d 781, 797-801, 167 P.2d 412, 420-22 (1946);
Tarr v. Hopewell Community Club, 153 Wash. 214, 279 P. 594 (1929); Goodrich v.
Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 184 P. 220 (1919); notes 87-88, supra.
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directly by a normative standard through the use of the concept of
market valueY1
2. Unreasonable Use
(a) Principle. The analysis of nuisance cases is based primarily on
the type and unreasonableness of the interference with the plaintiff's
property.92 In several cases, however, the Washington court seems to
have written its opinion from the perspective of the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct. These opinions do not reflect the general
rule, however, and they probably represent only extreme applications
of the balancing principle which is basic to the law of nuisance.9 4 The
pervasiveness of this balancing principle is suggested by the following
discussion of the court's consideration of the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct in determining whether it results in an actionable
nuisance.
(b) Uses Authorized by Statute. A Washington statute provides:
"Nothing which is done or maintained under the express authority
of a statute, can be deemed a nuisance."" This language leaves some
doubt as to what "express authority of a statute" means, and the
court has been quite liberal in its interpretation of the phrase, generally with the result that governmental actions taken under a broad
statutory authorization are given protection under the statute. 6 While
91. Cf. Comment, Valuation of Real Property-Role of the Expert Witness, 44 WASH.
L. REv. 687, 688-90 (1969) (discussion of hypothetical willing buyer and seller concept
of market value).
92. See notes 25, 26, 34 and accompanying text, supra.
93. See Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wn. 2d 24, 29, 145 P.2d 552, 554 (1944); Powell v.
Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
94. See notes 32, 34 and accompanying text, supra; compare Riblet v. SpokanePortland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952) with Powell v. Superior
Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 418 (1942) states:
In the field of nuisance . . . the courts have recognized the limitation upon
liability imposed by the defendant's privilege to make a reasonable use of his own
land, or to carry on his own reasonable enterprise. Everyone must put up with
some degree of inconvenience in a civilized community, and each defendant is
free, within reasonable limits, to carry on his own affairs at the expense of some
damage to his neighbors. It is only when his conduct is unreasonable, in the light
of its social utility and the harm which results, that it amounts to a nuisance.
The plaintiff must be expected to endure some danger and some inconvenience
rather than curtail the defendant's freedom of action, and the defendant must so
use his own property that he causes no undue harm to another. The law of private
nuisance is very largely a series of adjustments and compromises to limit the rights
and privileges of both parties. (Emphasis added).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.160 (1957).
96. See Deaconess Hospital v. Washington State Highway Commission, 66 Wn. 2d

Nuisance as a-Land Use Control
an early opinion suggested that municipal ordinances based on the
police power would be given the same effect as statutory authorizations, 9 7 the rule seems to be firmly adopted that a municipal ordinance authorizing a particular activity does not affect the court's
decision of whether the activity is a private nuisance.)8 This is especially important in land use control cases where building permits or
zoning ordinances purport to authorize the defendant's use of his
land.9 9 The legislative authorization statute is an absolute bar to a
successful nuisance action; however, the cases suggest that an action
brought on some other theory might be recognized, notwithstanding
legislative authorization, since the statute applies only to nuisance
actions. 10°
378, 408, 403 P2d 54, 72 (1965); Carlson v. Wenatchee, 56 Wn. 2d 932, 350 P.2d 457
(1960); Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wn. 2d 619, 304 P.2d 1046 (1956); Mola v. Metropolitan
Park Dist., 181 Wash. 177, 42 P.2d 435 (1935); Aubol v. Tacoma, 167 Wash. 442, 9
P.2d 780 (1932); Hughes v. McVay, 113 Wash. 333, 194 P. 565 (1920); see generally
Note, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 CoLVm. L. Rav. 781 (1952).
In each of these cases, it is highly probable that the legislature did not consider
the impact of the statute relied on by the defendant on causes of action for private
nuisance. Whether it intended to extinguish such causes of action is therefore a matter
of pure speculation, and it would seem to be appropriate for the court to give the
phrase "express authority of a statute" a much narrower construction, perhaps limiting
its application to statutes which refer to the particular event complained of by the
plaintiff and clearly indicate an intention to bar private nuisance actions. This would
seem to be especially appropriate in cases where governmental entities are defendants,
since the legislature has declared them to be liable for their torts as a general rule and
a clear intention to declare an exception to that rule should be required.
The court has suggested that the statute should be strictly construed in Bruskland
v. Oak Theater, Inc., 42 Wn. 2d 346, 350-51, 254 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1953):
The rule of law deducible from the statute and . . . cases is that, when proper
authority authorizes the operation of a lawful business in a certain area, such
business does not constitute a nuisance in a legal sense, but it may become such
if it is conducted in such an unreasonable manner that it substantially- annoys the
comfort and repose of others or essentially interferes with the enjoyment of property
in violation of RCW 7.48.010 and 7.48.120.
This language probably does not reflect the current law, however, in view of the
subsequent cases cited above and the fact that the Bruskland case involved authorization
by a zoning ordinance adopted by a municipality.
97. Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 P. 976 (1922).
98. Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964); Steele v. Queen City
Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn. 2d 402, 341 P.2d 499 (1959); Bruskland v. Oak Theater, Inc.,
42 Wn. 2d 3,46, 254 P.2d 1035 (1953); Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d

408 (1952).
99.

See cases cited in note 98, supra.

100. See Deaconess Hospital v. Washington State Highway Commission, 66 Wn. 2d

378, 408, 403 P.2d 54, 72 (1965); Carlson v. Wenatchee, 56 Wn. 2d 932, 936, 350 P.2d
457, 460 (1960) (dissent); Burback v. Bucher, 56 Wn. 2d 875, 879, 355 P.2d 981, 984

(1960); Mola v. Metropolitan Park Dist., 181 Wash. 177, 181, 42 P.2d 435, 437 (1935).
See notes 309-313 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of nuisances constituting trespass and notes 314-322 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of
nuisances constituting a constitutional taking or damaging of property.
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Private nuisances are found in an infinite number of changing settings involving a wide variety of relationships between individuals, and
the common law should be relied upon to maintain the flexibility
needed to provide the relief warranted by various circumstances.
While it is reasonable to extinguish nuisance actions when the legislature has expressly declared conduct to be authorized, the rights of
individuals should be recognized and considered by legislative bodies
enacting statutes, and the intent of such enactments with regard to
their effect on nuisance actions should be explicit."' Accordingly, express provisions of enactments should identify conduct which is authorized and thereby not to be deemed a nuisance and limit the types
of remedies available to individuals in certain nuisance actions so
that such remedies are compatible with the comprehensive planning
goals of the public. 102
101. Statutory enactments which are ambiguous as to their intended effects on
nuisance actions can result in a deprivation of effective protection for persons adversely
affected by nuisances. This is most likely to occur when statutes create administrative
agencies to perform functions relating to pollution control, etc. See Ellison v. Rayonier,
Inc., 156 F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Wash. 1957) ; see also cases and statutes cited in note 312,
infra; Peck, Standing Requirements for Obtaining Review of Governmental Action in
Washington, 35 WAsH. L. Rv. 362 (1960); Comment, Water Pollution Control in
Washington, 43 WAsa. L. Rav. 425 (1967).
102. The availability of injunctive relief could effectively prevent certain developments of land deemed to be in the public interest. It would seem that there is justification
for prohibiting injunctions in virtually any such case; however, the prohibition of
injunctive relief should not necessarily abolish the plaintiff's right to recover damages.
In most cases, strong justification would appear to be needed to extinguish damage
actions because the potential defendant in such cases should be expected to carry the
burden of the costs or losses incurred by others as a result of his use of his land.
Note, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 CoLUM. L. Rav. 781, 785-86 (1952)
summarizes the argument:
There is a valid reason for holding that legislative authorization confers a
privilege against suits to enjoin: the legislature in authorizing an activity determines
that it will produce more good than harm. Consequently, an injunction would
result in a net loss to society and should not be allowed. But this reasoning is not
applicable to damage actions except in the hypothetical situation, which has not
been encountered in the cases, where the magnitude of the damages would make
the cost of pursuing the activity prohibitive.
If the individuals engaged in the authorized activity are forced to make compensation for injuries resulting from it, they can, by raising the price of their
product or service, spread the cost of injuries over a wide number of persons.
This, of course, cannot be done by the individuals who are injured. Moreover,
in addition to a wider spreading of costs, payment for injuries through raising
prices has the advantage of requiring the ones that benefit from the activity, the
users of the resulting product or service, to bear the burden of the injuries caused
by such activity. Also, to require the creator of the nuisance to make compensation for injuries he causes will tend to encourage the development of better methods.
If the defendant is not required to compensate the plaintiff, there may be constitutional
objections to the statutory authorization of his conduct. See notes 314-322 and
accompanying text, infra.

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
(c) Nuisance Per Se. The Washington court has indicated that a
particular use might constitute a nuisance per se, being "an act, thing,
omission, or use of the property which in and of itself is a nuisance,
and hence is not permissible or excusable under any circumstances."'0 3 The court has further suggested that a person who creates
or maintains a nuisance per se is liable for its effects without limitation." 4 A search of the Washington cases, however, reveals only one
private nuisance action in which the concept of a nuisance per se had
any apparent effect on the decision.:05 This is perhaps appropriate,
since the application of the concept would be contrary to the basic
principle that a nuisance is basically an unreasonable interference,
and not an unreasonable use. 10 6 Cases which conclude that a use is
not a nuisance per se indicate that there is a further inquiry which is
the essential determination to be made in virtually all cases; namely,
the decision as to whether a particular interference constitutes a
nuisance in fact. 0 7 Unreasonable interference caused by unreasonable
use is the essence of a nuisance in fact, 08 and the following factors
are considered by the court in such cases in evaluating the unreasonableness of the defendant's use of his property.
(d) Character of Neighborhood. Recognizing that some interference with residential use of property in cities is inevitable because of
industrial development, 0 9 the court has frequently considered the char103. Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 325, 154 P. 450, 451
(1916) quoting 21 Ams. & ExG. ENcy. LAw 683 (2d ed. 1896); State v. Paggett, 8 Wash.
579, 36 P. 487 (1894). A somewhat different concept of nuisance per se is found in
some public nuisance cases. See State v. Boren 42 Wn. 2d 155, 253 P.2d 939 (1953);
but see State ex rel. Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn. 2d 664, 670, 220 P.2d 305,
308-09 (1950). See generally Note, Nuisance Per Se, 38 WAsHx. L. REv. 385 (1963).
104. Thornton v. Dow, 60 Wash. 622, 633, 111 P. 899, 903 (1910).
105. State v. Paggett, 8 Wash. 579, 36 P. 487 (1894). The reluctance of the court

to apply the doctrine of nuisance per se is suggested by several opinions. See State ex rel.
Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn. 2d 664, 670, 220 P.2d 305, 309 (1950) (public nuisance);
Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 P. 450 (1916).
106. See notes 25, 26, 34 and accompanying text, supra.
107. See Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964); State ex rel.
Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn. 2d 664, 670-71, 220 P.2d 305, 309 (1950) (public

nuisance); Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 P. 450 (1916);

Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 61 Wash. 230, 112 P. 255

(1910).
Nuisances other than those per se are called nuisances in fact, Hardin,supra, at 325, or

nuisances per accidens, Bradford, supra, at 671.

108. See notes 25, 26, 34 and accompanying text, supra.
109. Crawford v. Central Steam Laundry, 78 Wash. 355, 357-58, 139 P. 56, 57 (1914)
suggests the value judgment underlying the court's consideration of neighborhood characteristics:
Residents of cities must necessarily submit to some inconveniences from the noise,
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acter of the surrounding neighborhood in determining whether a particular activity results in a nuisance."' When the defendant's use of his
property fails to conform to the predominant use pattern of the area,
the court places considerable weight on this fact in arriving at its
conclusion of nuisance in fact."' Some cases suggest that the consideration of this factor may even be extended to an evaluation of the
impact of the defendant's use on the future development of the
area." 2 Conversely, the court frequently refers to the fact that the
defendant's activity conforms to the character of the neighborhood,
and seems to weigh this fact heavily in concluding that a particular
activity does not give rise to a nuisance."'
(e) Sequence of Events. Some Washington cases suggest that if
the defendant's use of his property was begun prior to the plaintiff's
use or acquisition of his property, that fact will be considered in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's use;" 4 however, it is
clear that his use being first in time is not a bar to concluding that

smoke, and smells of trades and industries carried on therein, and the courts cannot
abate every such trade or industry as a nuisance because it is offensive to some of
the residents and property owners within its immediate vicinity.
110. See Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn. 2d 275, 281, 300 P.2d 569, 572 (1956); Grant v.
Rosenburg, 112 Wash. 361, 192 P. 889 (1921), rehearing 112 Wash. 368, 196 P. 626
(1920); Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 P. 450 (1916). In,
Beuscher and Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L.
Rev. 440, the authors state at 443:
The courts . . . in deciding nuisance cases have much more than the analysts,
weighed heavily facts about the character of the area in which the protested use is
occurring. There is nothing new about this, it has been going on for a long time.
But recent cases clearly demonstrate a definite increase in judicial sensitivity to the
"character of the neighborhood."
See Levitin, Change of Neighborhood in Nuisance Cases, 13 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rrv. 340
(1964.)
111. See Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964); Snively v. Jabor,
48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956); Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn.
2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952); Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952);
State ex rel. Tollefson v. Mitchell, 25 Wn. 2d 476, 171 P.2d 245 (1946); Densmore v.
Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 61 Wash. 230, 112 P. 255 (1910).
112. See Snively v. Jabor, 48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956) (injunction for
sufficient period to permit residential development of area without interferences complained of); Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d 781, 800, 167 P.2d 412, 421 (1946) (area
"peculiarly adaptable for improvement with substantial homes and the rearing of
children") ; Grant v. Rosenburg, 112 Wash. 361, 368, 192 P. 889, 891, (1920), rehearing
112 Wash. 368, 196 P. 626 (1920), ("district suitable primarily for residential purposes
...and .. .its growth is being retarded . . ").
113. See Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn. 2d 275, 281, 300 P.2d 569, 572 (1956); Powell v.
Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 21, 129 P.2d 536, 540 (1942) ; Woodward
v. West Side Mill Co., 43 Wash. 308, 313, 86 P. 579, 581 (1906).
114. See Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536
(1942) ;Hite v. Cashmere Cemetery Ass'n, 158 Wash. 421, 290 P. 1008 (1930).

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
it creates an actionable nuisance 1 5 Thus, while priority is not conclusive, the court will generally consider it as a factor favoring the
prior user."" Prior notice of the defendant's plans for a use and the
length of time the defendant has maintained his use have also been
considered. 17
(f) Capacity to Control Objectionable Effects. If an action is
brought when the defendant is proposing his use, the court generally
8
assumes that the use will be carried out with proper management;"
but in some cases, it might be possible to convince the court that the
defendant will not be able to eliminate objectionable interference with
the plaintiff's property. 119 In such cases, and in cases where the defendant is already engaging in an activity alleged to result in a nuisance,
there is a possibility that the court will weigh the impossibility of eliminating the objectionable features of the activity in arriving at a conclusion that the activity does not give rise to a nuisance.120 However,
this possibility appears remote, 21 ' and the allegation should probably
115. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952).
In Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 190, 229 P. 306, 309 (1924), the
court stated:
It is said . . . that when appellants bought their property and moved onto it
the respondent's mill was in operation in substantially the same manner as now, and
that they, having come to the nuisance, may not recover. We cannot support this
doctrine, nor is it supported by the authorities.
This position is clearly articulated by RESTATmmNT (SEcoND) Oc ToRTs § 840D (Tent.
Draft No. 15, 1969):
The fact that the plaintiff has acquired or improved his land after a nuisance
interfering with it has come into existence is not in itself sufficient to bar his action,
but is a factor to be considered in determining whether the nuisance is actionable.
See note 35, supra (prescriptive rights).
116. See Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d 781, 801, 167 P.2d 412, 422 (1946); Powell v.
Superior Portland Cement Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942) ; Ehorn v. Northwest
Magnesite Co., 131 Wash. 270, 230 P. 419 (1924).
117. Hite v. Cashmere Cemetery Ass'n, 158 Wash. 421, 425, 290 P. 1008, 1010 (1930)
(plaintiff should have anticipated expansion of cemetery); Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d
781, 801, 167 P.2d 412, 422 (1946) (distinguishing certain cases involving long established
businesses).
118. See Hughes v. McVay, 113 Wash. 333, 339, 194 P. 565, 567 (1920).
119. See Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash. 328, 331-32, 287 P. 7, 8 (1930).
120. See Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 255-56, 248 P.2d
380, 383 (1952); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 16-17, 129
P.2d 536, 538 (1942).
The court might also consider the capacity to eliminate objectionable effects as bearing
on the defendant's motives, i.e., whether he acted maliciously. See note 137 and
accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of injunctions against maliciously erected
structures.
121. See State ex rel. Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn. 2d 664, 220 P.2d 305 (1950);
Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash. 328, 287 P. 7 (1930); Weller v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber
Co., 155 Wash. 526, 285 P. 446 (1930) ; Mattson v. Defiance Lumber Co., 154 Wash. 503,
282 P. 848 (1929); Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 P. 306 (1924).
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be avoided because of its potential for convincing the court that the
extreme remedy of absolute injunctive prohibition of the defendant's
use is appropriate. 2 2 In addition to this risk, the defendant's incapacity to control objectionable effects may result in a finding that he is
engaging in activity that is necessarily hazardous, with the result that
he may be strictly liable for the effects of such conduct under the
theory of extra hazardous activity.

23

(g) Public Interest in Use. A significant public interest is generally
found in public nuisance but is not necessarily involved in private
nuisance.124 When public interest is alleged by a party in a private
nuisance case, it will not be determinative of the case; 125 however, it
See notes 145-151 and accompanying text, infra.
Zimmer v. Stephenson, 66 Wn. 2d 477, 483, 403 P.2d 343, 346 (1965), quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 165 (1939), states that the proper rule now should be:
One who recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an extra hazardous activity,
enters land in the possession of another or causes a thing or third person so to enter
is subject to liability to the possessor if, but only if, his presence or the presence
of the thing or the third person upon the land causes harm to the land, to the
possessor thereof or to a thing or a third person in whose security the possessor has
a legally protected interest. (Emphasis added).
The court, at 479, noted the classic distinction between actions of trespass on the case
(which include nuisance actions) and actions of trespass, and concluded that actions
falling within the extra hazardous activity rule of the RESTATEMENT are actions of
trespass. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965) is identical with the original
except that the italicized language now reads: "abnormally dangerous." For a thorough
discussion of abnormally dangerous activity resulting in an unintentional but actionable
trespass, see Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961) (aerial spraying of
agricultural chemicals) ; see generally West, Nuisance or Rylands v. Fletcher, 30 CoNevEY.
95 (1966).
The RESTATEMENT rule discussed above applies only to trespasses, thus requiring a
physical invasion of land which constitutes a trespass. See notes 42-49, supra, and notes
309-313 and accompanying text, infra, for discussions of physical invasions and trespass.
However, a rule of broader application is announced by RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519
(1939), which provides:
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the actor should recognize is likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes
the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the
harm.
See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 520-24 (1939); see generally Freedman, Nuisance,
UltrahazardousActivities, and the Atomic Reactor, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 77 (1957).
124. See notes 221-237 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of basic principles of public nuisance.
125. See Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952) ; Mattson v. Defiance
Lumber Co., 154 Wash. 503, 282 P. 848 (1929) ; Ferry v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 648, 200 P.
336 (1921), rehearing 116 Wash. 661, 203 P. 40 (1921). Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash.
328, 337, 287 P. 7, 10 (1930) summarizes the impact of the public benefit or necessity
argument in certain cases:
Many necessary businesses, such as hospitals, sanitariums and undertaking establishments, as well as other lawful businesses . . . may become [nuisances] when the
conduct thereof is contemplated within an exclusively residential district. (Emphasis
added).
122.
123.
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will probably receive serious consideration by the court.2 6 Allegations
of public interest are generally asserted by defendants who are engaged in commercial or industrial activity,127 but such an interest may
also be a factor weighing on the plaintiff's side."
C. Remedies for Private Nuisance
1. Abatement
If an action is brought and a nuisance is found to exist, the Wash129
ington statutes provide that the plaintiff
may... , on motion, have an order allowing a warrant to issue
to the sheriff to abate such nuisance. Such motion shall be allowed, of course, unless it appears on the hearing that the nuisance has ceased, or that such remedy is inadequate to abate or
prevent the continuance of the nuisance....
The procedures for issuing such a warrant are prescribed by statute,
and no case law refining the statutory provisions was discovered.3 0
In addition to abatement by warrant, the Washington court has suggested that the person whose property is interfered with by a private
nuisance may abate the nuisance without bringing a judicial action.' 3'
However, this right is undoubtedly subject to the limitation that the

126. See Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn. 2d 402, 412, 341 P.2d 499, 505
'(1959); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 14, 15-16, 129 P.2d 536,
538 (1942).
127. See cases cited in note 126, supra.
128. Immorality is frequently the basis for statutory declarations of public nuisance,
see notes 253-257 and accompanying text, infra; however, it seems probable that the court
might react to immoral conduct in deciding private nuisance cases. Several private actions
for public nuisance have resulted in opinions suggesting that the court may respond more
to the immorality of the defendant's conduct than the language of its opinions generally
suggests. See Hall v. Galloway, 76 Wash. 42, 135 P. 478 (1913); Dempsie v. Darling, 39
Wash. 125, 81 P. 152 (1905). In the latter opinion, at 129, the court states:
[T]he nuisance complained of in this case is of an entirely different character

(from objectionable lawful businesses]. It is degrading, immoral, indecent, and

always under the ban of the law, and the courts ought not to be too exacting with
citizens who are asking relief from such impositions on their rights.
See also Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35 Wash. 92, 76 P. 513 (1904).
129. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.48.020 (1957).
130. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.48.030-.040 (1957); see Ahnot., WAsH. RFv. CODE ANNoT.
§§ 7.48.020-.040 (West Supp. 1969).
131. See Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 P. 298 (1921). This case involved
an encroachment, and there is a question as to whether the suggested remedy of abatement by self-help would extend to other types of nuisances or to cases where abatement
required entering property other than that owned by the property owner suffering the
injury.
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destruction or removal of the thing which creates the nuisance must
be carried out "without committing a breach of the peace, or doing
unnecessary injury."' 3 2 It is clear that the plaintiff's right to abate a
private nuisance without judicial action does not impose a duty to the
defendant to do so. 8 '
2. Equitable Remedies
(a) Injunctions." The Washington nuisance statutes clearly indicate that the defendant's creation or maintenance of a private nuisance may be enjoined by a superior court. 3 5 Numerous court opinions
have upheld injunctions against wrongful conduct resulting in a nuisance, regardless of the types of interferences involved." 6 In addition
to injunctive relief for nuisances, the statutes expressly authorize injunctions to compel the removal of or prohibit any structure which
is maliciously erected and "intended to spite, injure or annoy an adjoining proprietor."'""

132. See WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.230 (1957), which subjects the remedy of abatement
of a public nuisance by self help to his limitation. See note 285 and accompanying text,
infra, for discussion of the statute and case law.
133. Champa v. Washington Compressed Gas Co., 146 Wash. 190, 200, 262 P. 228,
231 (1927) (quoting several authorities upholding the principle) ; Forbus v. Knight, 24
Wn. 2d 297, 313, 163 P.2d 822, 829 (1945).
134. For a thorough and recent discussion of injunctions, see Developments in the
Law: Injunctions, 78 HAIv. L. REv. 994 (1965).
135. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.40.010 (1957) provides: "Restraining orders and injunctions may be granted by the superior court, or any judge thereof." WASH. REv. CODE
§ 7.48.010 (1957) states that a nuisance is "the subject of an action for damages and
other and further relief." WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.020 (1957) provides for abatement,
and if it is inadequate, "the plaintiff may have the defendant enjoined."
136. See Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wn. 2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964); Harris v.
Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952); Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d 781, 167
P.2d 412 (1946); Ferry v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 648, 200 P. 336 (1921), rehearing 116
Wash. 661, 203 P. 40 (1920); Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 184 P. 220 (1919);
Lavner v. Independent Light and Water Co., 74 Wash. 373, 133 P. 592 (1913); Everett
v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910); Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83
P. 14 (1905).
137. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.40.030 (1957) provides:
An injunction may be granted to restrain the malicious erection, by any owner or
lessee of land, of any structure intended to spite, injure or annoy an adjoining
proprietor. And where any owner or lessee of land has maliciously erected such a
structure with such intent, a mandatory injunction will lie to compel its abatement
and removal.
While this statute is technically not a nuisance statute, it is noted here because of its
possible utility in relation to nuisance actions which involve animosity between the
parties. The proscriptions of the statute could also be found to constitute private
nuisances. See Fridman, Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, 40 VA. L. REv. 583
(1954); Note, Spite Fence: A Newly Created Cause of Action, 9 Wyo. L.J. 74 (1954).
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Although law and equity actions are merged in Washington,' 8 a
prayer for injunctive relief results in procedural consequences which
should be kept in mind. For example it is quite likely that the parties
will not be entitled to a jury trial, since one of the main issues of the
action will be equitable, 8 9 and bonds or security may be required of
the plaintiff for the protection of the defendant. 4 ' It should also be
noted that an injunction may be dissolved or modified upon motion
after reasonable notice to the adverse party, 141 and after dissolution
or modification, the injunction may be reinstated. 42 Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders are expressly authorized
by statutes and court rules, and may be extremely useful in certain
nuisance actions.' 43 In applying for such orders, however, caution is
required because of the special requirements and procedures which
are applicable thereto.' 44
138.

WAsHE. Crv. P. SUPE.

CT. 2 states: "There shall be one form of action to be

known as 'civil action'."
139. Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wn. 2d 38, 41, 253 P.2d 427, 429 (1953) concludes:
The complaint contains a prayer for monetary damages, but also includes a prayer

for an injunction to abate a nuisance. Where any one of the main issues in an
action is equitable in nature, equity takes jurisdiction for all purposes, and there
is no right to trial by jury.
This result should not be reached where only a preliminary injunction is being sought.

See WA . Civ. R. SUPa. CT. 65(a).
140. See WVAsH. REv. CODE §§ 7.40.070, .080, .090 (1957); WAsH. Cirv. R. SUPER. CT.

65(c).

141. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.40.180 (1957).
State ex rel. Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn. 2d 664, 674, 220 P.2d 305, 311 (1950)
states the judicially developed rule:
It is generally recognized that a court of equity has inherent power to modify or
vacate a permanent preventive injunction where a change in circumstances demonstrates that the continuance of the injunction would be unjust or inequitable or no
longer necessary.
See Ehorn v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 131 Wash. 270, 277, 230 P. 419, 421 (1924).
142. VAsH. Rxv. CODE § 7.40.210 (1957).
143. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.40.020 (1957) provides guidelines for determining when
preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate.
When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of some act, the commission or continuance of which during the
litigation would produce great injury to the plaintiff; or when during the litigation,
it appears that the defendant is doing, or threatened, or is about to do, or is
procuring, or is suffering some act to be done in violation of the plaintiff's rights
respecting the subject of the action tending to render the judgment ineffectual;
an injunction may be granted to restrain such act ...
144. The notice requirements are quite stringent. WAsH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 65(a) (1)
states: "No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party."
See also WAsHr. REv. CODE § 7A0.050 (1957). However, pursuant to WAsHI. Civ. R. SUPER.
CT. 65(b), a temporary restraining order may be granted without notice to the adverse
party if:
(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified com-
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Injunctions are issued only to protect the parties from deprivation
of a right," 5 in the case of private nuisance from an unreasonable

interference with property caused by unreasonable use of other property. 4 6 In many cases, the type of use the defendant makes of his

plaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and
(2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any,
which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim that
notice should not be required.
WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 65(c) provides that:
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving
of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment
of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is
found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained....
Applications for injunctions must designate the kind of evidence to be introduced at
the hearing, which may be presented orally (with prior permission of the court) or by
affidavits, but this rule does not apply to restraining orders. WASH. CIv. R. SUPrER. CT.
43(e); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 7.40.060 (1957). WAsHr. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 65(d)
further states:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable
detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts
sought to be restrained ...
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.40.130 (1957) provides:
When notice of the application for an injunction has been served upon the
adverse party, it shall not be necessary to serve the order upon him, but he shall
be bound by the injunction as soon as the bond required of the plaintiff is executed
and delivered to the proper officer.
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 7.40.120 (1957), which states: "An order of injunction
shall bind every person and officer restrained from the time he is informed thereof."
Apparently, notice of the order and its contents is required to bind a defendant in an
ex parte proceeding; but if the defendant is notified of the proceeding such notice is not
required.
145. McInnes v. Kennell, 47 Wn. 2d 29, 38, 286 P.2d 713, 718 (1955) states the
principle:
Rights of adjoining landowners in the use and enjoyment of their property are
relative, but they are also equal. Equity cannot restrict one landowner to confer a
benefit on the other. It is only when an unreasonable or unlawful use of land by
one property owner infringes upon some right of another in the reasonable use and
enjoyment of his land that equity will intervene.
146. 5 J. POMEROY AND J. POMEROY, JR., EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITrABLE
REMEDIES § 1926 (1919) summarizes the relationship between nuisance law and equitable
remedies:
The term "nuisance" has in equity no different signification from that given it in
law. Anything which is a nuisance in law is also a nuisance in equity, and, on the
other hand, "it is true that equity will only interfere, in a case of nuisance, where
the thing complained of is a nuisance at law; there is no such thing as an equitable
nuisance." This is not saying that the jurisdiction of law and that of equity are
coextensive; it is simply pointing out that equity in the determination of what
constitutes a nuisance follows the law. Whether, assuming a nuisance to exist, equity
will take jurisdiction to enjoin it, is another question, a question which is answered
in every particular case by determining whether there is a need of equity interposing;
whether, in the usual phrase, the legal remedy is adequate.
As to whether equitable relief is appropriate in nuisance cases, see the following chapters
in standard equity texts: 5 POMEROY, supra, ch. 24; W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON Equrry
cbs. 7, 8 (1930).
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property does not, in and of itself, cause an unreasonable interference
with the plaintiff's property, but the manner in which the defendant's
use is undertaken results in such interference. In these cases, the court
generally addresses an injunction to the objectionable aspects of the
defendant's conduct, that is, the manner of conducting his use rather
than the type of use to which his property is put.'4 7 The injunction
may require that the defendant meet a precise standard, but more often
it will require that the defendant engage in his use in a manner which
will not result in the objectional effects. 148 As indicated by the above
discussion of actionable nuisance, the standards for determining what
effects are prohibited by nuisance law are extremely imprecise, and if
the injunction is directed to the objectionable effects of the defendant's conduct he may find it quite difficult to ascertain an acceptable
149
standard by which to continue the use of his property.
Of course, if the court concludes that the defendant cannot engage
in a particular use of his property without causing an unreasonable
interference with other property, it may enjoin the use itself rather
than the objectionable aspects of it.' 50 As a practical matter, this is
probably required in some cases because of the defendant's circum-

147. See State ex rel. Tollefson v. Mitchell, 25 Wn. 2d 476, 480, 171 P.2d 245, 247
(1946); Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wn. 2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944); see also Snively v.
Jaber, 48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956); Haveman v. Beulow, 36 Wn. 2d 185, 217
P.2d 313 (1950); Zey v. Long Beach, 144 Wash. 582, 258 P. 492 (1927); Ehorn v.
Northwest Magnesite Co., 131 Wash. 270, 230 P. 419 (1924).
148. See cases cited in note 147, supra. For attempts by the court to prescribe precise
standards, see especially Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wn. 2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944); Ehorn v.
Northwest Magnesite Co., 131 Wash. 270, 230 P. 419 (1924).
149. See notes 34-128 and accompanying text, supra, for discussion of what constitutes
a private nuisance; cases cited in note 147, supra.
An alternative to ordering the defendant, in effect, to conduct his land use in a manner
which does not result in a nuisance is to require that he submit a plan for eliminating the
objectionable effects of his use to the court for approval. See Ames Lake Community
Club v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 769, 774, 420 P.2d 363, 366 (1966). This type of remedy might
be accompanied by the use of a referee to supervise the implementation of the plan.
See notes 168-171 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of the use of referees.
150. See Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash. 328, 287 P. 7 (1930) ; Grant v. Rosenburg, 112
Wash. 361, 192 P. 889 (1920), rehearing 112 Wash. 368, 196 P. 626 (1920).
State ex tel. Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn. 2d 664, 672, 220 P.2d 305, 310 (1950)
suggests the reluctance of the court to enjoin a use rather than its offensive characteristics:
Had the [trial) court based the . . . orders upon a finding that it would be impossible or impracticable to operate the plant in such manner as to avoid offense,
there is little doubt that an unconditional injunction would have been appropriate,
in view of the previous opportunity which had been accorded [defendant] to overcome the difficulty. . . . But, where such a finding has not been made, the usual
remedy is to restrain the operation until the condition has been corrected, rather
than to unconditionally abate the business....
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vention of more limited injunctions or his propensity to engage in unsuccessful efforts to prevent the proscribed interference.' 5' Injunctions

and restraining orders may be granted subject to equitable terms or
conditions imposed on the plaintiff,'52 and while this increases the

adaptability of injunctions as remedies, it may result in a remedy
which is of very little practical value to the plaintiff. 5

Notwithstanding the extensive powers of the courts to protect the
defendant when an injunction is granted, there are many cases where
a private nuisance is found to exist, but injunctive relief in any form

is denied.' 5 4 Denial of an injunction in these cases is based upon the
remedy's equitable nature 5 and the court's weighing of the factors
involved in a case without emphasizing the unreasonableness of the

interference complained of to the same extent as it does in deciding
whether there is a nuisance."' In addition, the court considers a wider
range of factors than is considered in determining whether there is a
nuisance, and has suggested:157
The appropriateness of injunction against tort depends upon

a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case, including the following primary factors:

(a) the character of the interest to be protected,
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and
of the remedies [available]....
151.

Cf. State ex rel. Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn. 2d 664, 220 P.2d 305 (1950).
WASr. REV. CODE § 7.40.070 (1957) provides:
Upon the granting or continuing an injunction, such terms and conditions may be
imposed upon the party obtaining it as may be deemed equitable.
See generally Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RUTGERS
L. REv. 639 (1962).
153. Cf. First Methodist Episcopal Church v. Barr, 123 Wash. 425, 212 P. 546
(1923).
154. Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wn. 2d 929, 935-36, 395 P.2d 183, 187 (1964) states
the principle:
After an interference with comfort and convenience is established, there arise the
further questions as to whether the lawful, but interfering, use should be enjoined,
or whether the payment of damages is adequate compensation for the interference,
or whether it is damnum absque injuria.
See Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964); Woodard v. West Side Mill
Co., 43 Wash. 308, 86 P. 579 (1906).
155. See PROSSER at 624-25; note 146, supra.
156. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text, supra, for a discussion of the balancing
of the unreasonableness of the interference and the use; Note, Injunction-Nuisance-Balancing the Equities, 5 WASH. L. REv. 76 (1930).
157. Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn. 2d 402, 411, 341 P.2d 499, 504
(1959) quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 936 (1939); see Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber
Co., 131 Wash. 183, 191, 229 P. 306, 309 (1924).
152.
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(c) plaintiff's delay in bringing suit,
(d) plaintiff's misconduct,
(e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is denied,
(f) the interests of third persons and the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or
judgment.
Some of the factors considered by this statement are bases of the
traditional equitable defenses of estoppel and waiver. 58 The broad
scope of the factors stated to be relevant indicates that consideration
will also be given to the imminence of the unreasonable interference
alleged 59 and probably all of the factors considered in determining
whether the defendant's use is so unreasonable as to result in a nuisance; 160 however, these factors are generally insufficient to preclude
158. For the application of these defenses in nuisance actions, see Mahoney Land Co.
v. Cayuga Investment Co., 88 Wash. 529, 153 P. 308 (1915); Woodard v. West Side Mill
Co., 43 Wash. 308, 86 P. 579 (1906).
Equitable estoppel has been discussed in several Washington opinions. Finley v. Finley,
43 Wn. 2d 755, 763-64, 264 P.2d 246, 251 (1953), quoting Huff v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
38 Wn. 2d 103, 114, 228 P.2d 121, 128 (1951), states:
Where a person with actual or constructive knowledge of facts induces another, by
his words or conduct, to believe that he acquiesces in or ratifies a transaction, or that
he will offer no opposition thereto, and that other, in reliance on such belief, alters
his position, such person is estopped from repudiating the transaction to the other's
prejudice.
See Heasley v. Riblet Tramway Co., 68 Wn. 2d 927, 416 P.2d 331 (1966); Thomas v.
Harlan, 27 Wn. 2d 512, 178 P.2d 965 (1947).
The court has also discussed waiver, identifying it as "the voluntary relinquishment
of a known right." Voelker v. Joseph, 62 Wn. 2d 429, 435, 383 P.2d 301, 306 (1963),
quoting Dunbar v. Farnum, 109 Vt. 313, 196 A. 237, 241 (1938). The court continued,
at 435-36:
To establish [waiver], there must be shown an act or omission on the part of the
one charged with the waiver fairly evidencing an intention permanently to surrender
the right in question .... It may be express or implied. But if it is the latter class,
caution must be exercised both in proof and application. The facts and circumstances
must be unequivocal in character. . . . Silence alone is never a waiver. It is only
where there is an obligation to speak that it has that result.
See generally 28 Amr. Jum. 2d Estoppel and Waiver (1966).
159. Turner v. Spokane, 39 Wn. 2d 332, 335, 235 P.2d 300, 301-02 (1951) articulates
the principle:
While it is true that a court of equity may enjoin a threatened or anticipated
nuisance, public or private, where it clearly appears that a nuisance will necessarily
result from the contemplated act or thing which it is sought to enjoin, yet the
court ought, not to interfere where the injury is of a character to justify conflicting
opinions as to whether it will in fact ever be realized.
160. See notes 92-128 and accompanying text, supra, for discussion of the factors
considered in evaluating the unreasonableness of the defendant's use.
See especially Mattson v. Defiance Lumber Co., 154 Wash. 503, 513, 282 P. 848, 851
(1929) (incapacity to control objectionable effects); Woodard v. West Side Mill Co., 43
Wash. 308, 316-17, 86 P. 579, 582 (1906) (character of neighborhood) ; Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 191, 229 P. 306, 309 (1924) (public interest); Steele
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injunctive relief in cases where the plaintiff makes a substantial allegation of fear of harm 6 ' or of an encroachment. 62
(b) Contempt. An exercise of the civil contempt power is the
means usually employed to secure enforcement of injunctions.' 6 3 A
Washington statute authorizes the exercise of the power for "[d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order or process of the
court,"' 64 and it has been held that for civil contempt, there is no
need to find "wilful and deliberate" disobedience.' 65 The Washington
court has stated that an injunction may bind successive owners of
property who had no notice of it,'6 6 but it seems likely that a more
v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn. 2d 402, 412, 341 P.2d 499, 504-05 (1959)
(defendant's substantial hardship from injunction).
161. See cases cited in notes 50-52, supra.
162. See cases cited in note 46, supra; Note, Injunction-Removal of encroachments
by an Adjoining Owner, 8 WAsH. L. REv. 43 (1934).
163. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.20.020 (1956) grants the courts power to punish contempt
and provides for certain limitations on the power.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.23.010 (1956) provides that criminal contempt, which is a
misdemeanor, includes: "Wilful disobedience to the lawful process or mandate of a court."
Criminal contempt is thus available for the enforcement of injunctions, but it is rarely
used, probably because of the requirement of a jury trial. State v. Boren, 42 Wn. 2d
155, 253 P.2d 939 (1953). It is interesting to note that a defendant may apparently be
acquitted of the charge of committing a crime, be enjoined from engaging in the same
conduct he was accused of in the criminal proceeding, and be convicted of contempt
under WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.23.010 with the result that he is criminally liable. See Boren
at 164.
164. WAsr. REv. CODE § 7.20.010(5) (1956).
165. Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wn. 2d 929, 934, 395 P.2d 183, 186 (1964) (based on
WAsr. REv. CODE § 7.20.010(5) (1956)). But see WAsr. REv. CODE § 7A0.150 (1957),
which provides as to preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders:
Whenever it shall appear to any court granting a restraining order or an order
of injunction, or by affidavit, that any person has wilfully disobeyed the order after
notice thereof, such court shall award an attachment for contempt against the
party charged, or an order to show cause why it should not issue. . . . (Emphasis
added).
166. State v. Terry, 99 Wash. 1, 6, 168 P. 513, 515 (1917), quoting State v. Porter,
76 Kan. 411, 91 P. 1073, 1074 (1907), rationalizes the result as follows:
The decree of injunction was against the defendants in that suit, and, in a sense,
was ad rem-against the property, or rather against a certain illegal use of the
property. It cut off perpetually the use of the property for any of the purposes which
the prohibitory liquor law of this state denounces as a nuisance. Thereafter, not only
the parties to that action, but all persons using the property for any of such unlawful
purposes, did so at their peril. The judgment is a limitation upon the use of the
property of which all subsequent owners or occupants must take notice.
But the Washington court continues, at 6, finding:
[It is] unnecessary to rest our decision entirely upon the constructive notice imposed
by the decree itself. . . . We are satisfied, as was the trial court, that appellant had
actual knowledge of the injunction ...
Thus, the strength of the holding that the decree operated in rem is weakened. The fact
that the case involved a public nuisance which constituted a crime also weakens the
probability that an "in rem" injunction would be recognized in private nuisance
actions. The weakness of the case as precedent is further compounded by the questionable wisdom of enforcing decrees against persons who have no knowledge of them.
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restrictive requirement of notice reflects the current Washington law,
in view of the court's subsequent statement: 167
The rule is, in cases of injunction, that the injunction binds the
parties defendant, who are named and upon whom service has
been secured, and all other persons who have knowledge of its
provisions; in other words, that persons not parties to the injunction proceeding and against whom the decree is not directed
by name may be punished for contempt if they violate the terms
of the decree, provided that, subsequent to the making of the
decree, they have been served with a copy of it or have had
notice of it.
Thus, exercise of the civil contempt power would seem to be effectively restricted to persons with knowledge or reason to have knowledge of the decree.
(c) Referees. Many injunctions are vague and indefinite in nuisance cases and the subject matter of such injunctions may be extremely complex.108 In such cases there are serious doubts as to the
justification or effectiveness of the contempt proceeding as a means
of achieving justice, 6 9 and the Washington courts may deal with these
cases by appointing a referee with power to "execute an order, judgment or decree or to exercise any other power or perform any other
7 0 No Washington cases
duty expressly authorized by law."M
involving
referees in nuisance actions have been found, but it seems that the
complex environmental problems which will probably result in numer167.

State ex rel. Lindsley v. Grady, 114 Wash. 692, 693, 195 P. 1049, 1050 (1921);

see WAS r. REV. CODE § 7.40.120 (1957); WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 65(d),

(e); note

165, supra;Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MIMNN. L. REv. 719 (1965).
168. See note 149 and accompanying text, supra.
169. The use of contempt results in an "all or nothing" enforcement procedure with
the defendant being in a position of having to outguess the court's view of required
standards in many cases. See note 149 and accompanying text, supra. In this setting, he
may successfully avoid punishment for contempt, but he may also make good faith efforts
to comply with the court's decree only to find that it is unrealistic or so indefinite that
it is impracticable to be certain that he has complied with it. A supervised program to
eliminate the objectionable characteristics of a particular land use would seem to be a
preferable alternative to most defendants who intend in good faith to comply with the
decree. For those who do not so intend, supervision by an officer of the court should
provide the feedback necessary to permit the court to take further appropriate action.
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.24.060 (3) (1956). This section also provides for referees
with power
(1) To try an issue of law or of fact in a civil action or proceeding and report
thereon.
(2) To ascertain any other fact in a civil action or proceeding when necessary for
the information of the court, and report the fact or to take and report the evidence
in an action.
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ous nuisance actions in the future will warrant an increased use of
referees to enforce decrees.1 7'
(d) Servitudes. The early Chancery courts refused to grant remedies other than those which operated in personam, 7 2 but statutes
and court rules in most jurisdictions, including Washington, now provide that equity courts may grant certain "in rem" remedies, e.g., to
"enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in
173
others" if the property is located within the jurisdiction of the court.
The preventive remedy generally sought in nuisance cases is injunctive relief, and the doubtful validity of "in rem" injunctions is discussed above.1' The reason that "in rem" injunctions should not be
recognized is that they are effective against a person without knowledge or notice, and contempt actions may be unjustly brought against
such persons by virtue of their activities on land which is subject
7
to the injunctionY.
In addition to injunctions which might be effective
"in rem," collateral estoppel may be effective to decide subsequent
cases involving a tract of land, and with the application of this concept to subsequent actions, a person who has no detailed knowledge of
a previous decree may also be unjustly subjected to it.'
171. For a discussion of the appointment and use of special judicial officers to enforce
decrees, see United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 292-94 (W.D. La. 1963). See also
19 A.m. Jua. Equity §§ 364-83 (1939) (discussion of masters in chancery); Note,
Development in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HAsRv. L. REV. 994, 1092-93 (1965) (discussion
of receivers).
172. W. WArsn, TREATISE ON EQUITY 44 (1930) states:
Chancery's method of enforcing her decrees by compelling the defendant to obey
them under penalty of imprisonment was no doubt, originally borrowed from the
canon law....
We know that Chancery used this method of personal compulsion,
in personam, exclusively during the earlier periods, without resort to the method at
law of giving a judgment adjudicating title to land or for damages enforced by
execution through the sheriff.
4 J. POMEROY AND J. POMEROY, JR., EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES
§ 1433 (2d ed. 1919).
173. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 70; 4 J. POMEROY AND J. POMEROY, JR., EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE RMDIES § 1434 (2d ed., 1919). W. WALsH, TREATISE ON
EQUITY 48-49 (1930) concludes:
It is clear . . . that any limitations upon equity's power to give relief by decree
operating in rem or enforced in rem by execution, prior to modern statutes which
have almost completely swept away such limitations, are based partly on historical
accident and principally upon the way in which equity developed outside the common law as a competing and corrective system of law, and all reason for continuing
alive limitations of this kind have disappeared with the elimination of the struggle
between law and equity.
See id. § 11.
174. See notes 164-167 and accompanying text, supra.
175. See notes 164-167, supra; 176 and accompanying text, infra.
176. See note 194, infra, for a discussion of collateral estoppel.

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
In some types of actions, such as quiet title, eminent domain, and
divorce, "in ren" remedies are granted and the title to property or
an interest therein is divested and/or vested by the court.1 77 In many

It is doubtful that persons who hold subsequent interests in the land on which the
use is restricted by a previous decree will receive notice of the decree. Title insurance
companies take care to list as encumbrances on title reports and policies any judicial proceedings which have an effect upon title. Money judgments which constitute a lien fall
into this category. See WASH. Rv. CODE §§ 4.56.190 (1969), 4.56.200, .210, .225 (1956);
28 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1963 (1964). In rem decrees expressly vesting title to real property are
also included. See WASH. Civ. R. SUPER CT. 70. However, injunctive decrees are in
personam, and are not shown on title reports unless they happen to come to the attention of the title examiner, in which case they may be "noted," but not shown as
encumbrances. In the event a lis pendens has been filed in the action, they will be
shown as encumbrances. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.28.320 (1959), 4.28.325 (1969). The
foregoing appears to be the prevalent procedure used by Title Insurance Companies.
Telephone conversation with Mr. Bill Edwards, attorney, Transamerica Title Insurance
Co., Seattle, Washington, January 6, 1970.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.320 (1959) provides for filing a lis pendens with the county
auditor:
In an action affecting the title to real property the plaintiff, at the time of filing
the complaint, or at any time afterwards . . . or a defendant, when he sets up an
affirmative cause of action in his answer, and demands substantive relief at the time
of filing his answer, or at any time afterwards, if the same be intended to affect
real property, may file with the auditor of each county in which the property is
situated a notice of the pendency of the action . . . . From the time of filing only
shall the pendency of the action be constructive notice to a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, and every person whose conveyance or
encumbrance is subsequently executed or subsequently recorded . . . shall be bound
by all proceedings taken after the filing of such notice to the same extent as if he
were a party to the action ....
Provided, however, that such notice shall be of no
avail unless it shall be followed by the first publication of the summons, or by the
personal service thereof on a defendant within sixty days after such filing. (Emphasis
added).
See also WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.325

(1969)

(lis pendens in actions in United States

District Courts). Actions for injunctive relief do not affect the title to real property, so the
statute does not authorize the filing of the lis pendens or give it operative effect as
constructive notice in such actions. Even the most cautious plaintiffs are therefore unable
to assure subsequent holders of interests in the defendant's property of notice of the
action. See generally Note, Civil Procedure-Lis Pendens-May not be Filed in an
Action to Enjoin Nuisance, 26 ALm. L. Rnv. 315 (1962); Note Real Property-Lis
Pendens-Action to Abate Nuisance No Basis for Lis Pendens, 36 ST. JoHns L. REv. 373
(1962).
177. Eminent domain statutes authorize judicial vestings of title by decrees of
appropriation. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 8.04.120 (1956) (actions by state), 8.08.060
(1956) (actions by counties), 8.12.210 (1956) (actions by cities), 8.16.110 (1956)
(actions by school districts). The right of corporations and individuals to condemn
interests in land for certain purposes has long been recognized, and is accomplished by
judicial proceedings which revest title to real property or interests therein. WASH. REv.
CODE § 8.20.090 (1956) provides that in such actions:
At the time of rendering judgment for damages . . . the court or judge thereof
shall also enter a judgment or decree of appropriation of the land, real estate,
premises, right-of-way or other property sought to be appropriated, thereby vesting
the legal title to the same in the corporation seeking to appropriate such ...
Whenever said judgment or decree of appropriation shall affect lands, real estate or
other premises, a certified copy of such ... may be filed for record in the office of
the auditor of the county where the said land, real estate or other premises are
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nuisance cases, similar remedies would also seem to be appropriate
in view of the land use basis of most nuisance actions. A court could
give a more effective and fair remedy in a nuisance case by imposing
a servitude similar to that imposed by an easement restricting the uses
of the defendant's land and causing a record of such servitude to be
recorded in the county's real property records.'
The decree would
thus operate to notify all subsequent holders of interests in the land
of the restrictions on its use, and it would be just to expect subsequent
holders to comply with such restrictions. It might also be advisable
to impose a servitude on the plaintiff's land when he has been awarded
damages in the amount of the decrease in the market value of his
situated, and shall be recorded by said auditor like a deed of real estate and with like
effect ...
See WASH. REV. CODE § 8.24.030 (1956) (actions for private ways of necessity).
Decrees in quiet title actions are conclusive as to the title, but WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.28.260 (1956) provides for a procedure somewhat different from that employed to
implement eminent domain decrees:
[T]he judgment . . . shall be conclusive as to the estate in such property and the
right of possession thereof, so far as the same is thereby determined, upon all persons
claiming by, through, or under the party against whom the judgment is rendered,
by title or interest passing after the commencement of the action, if the party in
whose favor the judgment is rendered shall have filed a [Us pendens]...
Statutory provision for court dispositions of property in divorce cases are found in
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1958).
178. The procedure for giving the decree an in rem effect need not be identical to
that employed in other types of actions. It would seem that the Us pendens procedure
would be valuable, at least during the pendency of the action, and that it would be
available under existing statutes if an in rem decree was being sought, since the action
would then be one "affecting the title to real property." See note 176, supra. The decree
would best serve its function if a copy thereof was filed with the county auditor of the
county in which the property was located, so as to give interested persons detailed
knowledge of its contents. See note 77, supra.
C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WIT LAND" 4 (2d
ed. 1947) summarizes easements as involving
rights in rem, good against the world generally. But each specially concerns one
or more legal relations with a particular landowner. . . . The individual who has
the right, privilege, or power . . . has the benefit; the one who has the duty, no-right,
or liability has the burden. When the benefit is to be exercised for a particular
parcel of land, it is appurtenant to and passes with such land; when it is personal
to a named person, it is said to be in gross. Ordinarily the burden will not be in
gross, but will rest upon the owner of the so-called "servient" land.
At 65, Clark points out:
The burden on the servient land passes with such land to all takers thereof ....
The
benefit of an easement appurtenant to some dominant tenement passes freely
therewith, even without separate mention.
Servitudes imposed for the benefit of plaintiffs who are landowners would be appurtenant
to their lands, thus running with the land. In actions by the public, servitudes would be
in gross as the term is sometimes used, and the benefit would not be appurtenant to any
land. See CLARK at 83-89. In either case, however, the burden would run with the
defendant's land, since it would be the servient tenement.
Judicial creation of servitudes amounting to legal interests in land would probably
require statutory authorization. However, the courts could conceivably use their equity
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property caused by the defendant's use of his land. 17 9 By imposing a
servitude in such cases, the court would be acknowledging the defendant's right to create a nuisance as to the plaintiff's land and the
fact that the plaintiff has been permanently compensated therefor.
Subsequent purchasers of the plaintiff's property would be protected
by having notice of the defendant's right to maintain the nuisance
without compensating the owner of the property for property losses
caused thereby. Imposition of servitudes should also lead the courts
to inquire into the total effect of preventive remedies very closely, and
to examine each case in detail to determine who are necessary and
appropriate parties. 18 0 In this way, the judicial proceedings in a given
powers to find equitable servitudes, which would be enforced similarly to easements.
CLARK at 174-75. Equitable servitudes are based on "the equitable doctrine of notice,
that he who takes land with notice of a restriction upon it will not in equity and good
conscience be permitted to act in violation of the terms of these restrictions." CLARK
at 170. Some courts have applied the concept to conclude that the reasonable expectations
of property owners in acquiring subdivision lots resulted in "reciprocal negative easements" in the lots which restricted their use, even though no written restrictions were in
existence. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925); see
generally 2 AwymcAN LAW O PROPERTY § 9.33 (1952); 5 R. PoWELL, Tam LAW OF

REA PROPERTY II 679 (recomp. 1968 by P. Rohan). It would seem that property
owners' reasonable expectations would justify recognition of such servitudes by the

courts in the case of nuisance actions, since the restriction of the servitude would be
against tortious conduct, Recording the decree declaring the servitude should constitute
sufficient notice to holders of subsequent interests in the defendant's land to bind them
without actual notice of the servitude. See CLARK at 183.
179. See note 196 and accompanying text, infra, for discussion of the measure of
damages in nuisance actions.
In such cases, it is very doubtful that a subsequent purchaser will be permitted to
recover for the same injury that his predecessor in title was fully compensated for,
because he will be a privy to his grantor and barred by collateral estoppel. Even so, it is
likely that a subsequent purchaser would not be aware of the previous recovery by the
plaintiff, and would pay an excessive amount for the property because of his lack of
knowledge of the previous award or the existence of the nuisance. An in rem decree
would give him record notice of the interest for which compensation had been paid,
similar to the notice now given in eminent domain actions. See notes 176-178, supra.
180. In a case where a number of properties are involved, some holders of interest in
some tracts may not join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants. It would seem that the
courts could best render effective relief by considering such cases in light of the totality
of related events which might constitute a nuisance, rather than entertaining individual,

and probably sporadic, actions at the whim of each potential plaintiff. With the granting
of damages or injunctive relief to and against individual parties, the courts are likely to
regard such cases as appropriate for permissive, but not necessary, joinder, since WAsr.
Civ. R. SuPER. CT. 20(a) would appear to be applicable:

All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all of these persons will arise in the action. All persons may

be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants -will arise in the action. ...
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case may be limited to one action, with adequate protection granted
to all parties through the use of joinder or class actions.
A possible problem with in rem decrees on the defendant's land is
the provision of the Washington state constitution that private property shall not be taken for a private use, regardless of whether just
compensation is paid. 8 ' The imposition of a servitude on the defendant's land in favor of a private party might be found to violate this
provision;18 2 however, the common law has long recognized that the
uses which would be forbidden by such a servitude are unlawful and
not included among the rights which are held by an owner of property.
It is therefore doubtful that the courts would find the imposition of
such servitudes to be barred by the state constitution." 3

If servitudes are potential remedies in an action involving more than one potential
plaintiff or defendant, there are two things that must be identified with respect to each
servitude imposed: (1) What land does it encumber? (2) What land does it operate
in favor of? If either of these questions is unanswered, the servitude will be of doubtful
validity since the very nature of a servitude requires a dominant and servient tenement.
See note 178, supra. Cases where such remedies are possible would seem to fall within
the criteria for necessary joinder. WAsHr. Civ. R. SuPER. CT. 19(a) provides for necessary
joinder of a person
. . . if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (A) as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (B) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest ...
See also WAsHi. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 21 (misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties).
See note 303 and accompanying text, infra (class actions).
181. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16 provides as follows:
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of
necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for
agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes ...
182. Cf. State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 26 Wash. 278, 66 P. 385 (1901) ; White
Bros. & Crum Co. v. Watson, 64 Wash. 666, 671-72, 117 P. 497, 499 (1911); Tyree v.
Gosa, 11 Wn. 2d 572, 580-81, 119 P.2d 926, 930 (1941); Mathews v. First Christian
Church, 355 Mo. 627, 197 S.W.2d 617, 621 (1946).
183. The servitude imposed as a remedial device would actually have no substantive
effect, since the proscriptions or rights identified therein existed prior to the judicial action
and the decree merely identified the common law or statutory rights and duties of the
parties with respect to the use of their land and their conduct. Therefore, the imposition
of the servitude should not be regarded as a taking of property, because it has not
adversely affected recognized property rights. In this regard, it is interesting to note that
the benefits of restrictive covenants have generally been recognized as a property right
for purposes of eminent domain. Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 1137 (1965); 5 RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 566 (1944). The Washington court has held that private property under
the state constitution includes non-possessory and intangible property interests. State
ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 26 Wash. 278, 66 P. 385 (1901). Yet the Washington court has freely refused to recognize restrictions imposed by such covenants
when common law or equitable rules in effect nullify such restrictions. See Ronberg v.
Smith, 132 Wash. 345, 232 P. 283 (1925); cases cited in note 158, supra. Easements
have long been recognized as being extinguished upon abandonment, with the court merely
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With the use of joinder and class actions and the imposition of
servitudes as part of their remedial system, the courts can use nuisance concepts to resolve numerous disputes in a relatively permanent
manner; however, this potentiality will probably raise the objection
that the settlement of such a dispute with such a permanent remedy
is too rigid and precludes adjustments or modifications for future
changes in circumstances. There are two facts which should suffice to
answer this objection. First, equity courts have a well recognized
power to modify their decrees if a change in circumstances warrants. 8 4 Second, in future equity actions to enforce servitudes, the
equity courts will recognize a number of equitable defenses based on
changing circumstances in deciding whether to enforce such servitudes. These defenses include equitable estoppel, waiver, and changes
in the surrounding neighborhood, which should offer the flexibility
needed to accommodate changing circumstances relevant to the future

use of land."8 5

declaring the rights of the parties at the time of suit, not taking or damaging-the original
dominant servitude, and this doctrine has been suggested as being applicable to nullification of interests derived under covenants. See CrARK, REAL COVENANTS AM OTHER
INTERESTS WincH "RUN wiTH LAND" 186 (2d ed. 1947); see also Botts, Removal of
Outmoded Restrictions, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 428 (1955). Interests in land are also affected
by judicial decisions relating to adverse possession and prescription, without the courts
running afoul of the constitutional prohibition of taking private property for private use.
See generally Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L. Rv.
53 (1960).
The examples of accepted law above suggest that the courts can impose servitudes
as remedies for nuisance without violating Article 1 § 16 of the Washington Constitution. See notes 314-322 and accompanying text, infra, for further discussion of constitutional provisions.
184. See notes 142-145 and accompanying text, supra.
185. See notes 158, 183, supra (estoppel and waiver in covenant actions).
Injunctive relief may also be denied in covenant actions because of changes in the
neighborhood. See Ronberg v. Smith, 132 Wash. 345, 352, 232 P. 283, 285 (1925)
(quotation and dictum); Botts, Removal of Outmoded Restrictions, 8 U. FLA. L. Rv.
428 (1955); 5 RESTATEaENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944); 20 Am. JuR. 2d Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions § 183 (1965). The Washington court has also consistently
held that covenants should be strictly construed in order to preserve to the greatest
extent possible the free use of land. See Burton v. Douglas County, 65 Wn. 2d 619, 399
P.2d 68 (1965); Gwinn v. Cleaver, 56 Wn. 2d 612, 354 P.2d 912 (1960); Jones v.
Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 106 P. 166 (1910).

Even so, servitudes would probably shift the burden to the party challenging the
servitude. See Granger v. Boulls, 21 Wn. 2d 597, 601, 152 P.2d 325, 327 (1944);
Beaulaurier v. Washington State Hop Producers, 8 Wn. 2d 79, 85, 111 P.2d 559, 661
(1941). This results in an advantage for the party seeking to retain the effectiveness
of the previous adjudication. See note 194, infra, for discussion of cases relating to
collateral estoppel.
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3. Damages
The plaintiff may be awarded damages proved by him" 6 regardless
of whether the nuisance is abated'8 7 or injunctive relief is granted or
denied. 88 "[R]ecovery may be had for 'sickness, suffering, mental
anguish and bodily infirmities,' "'19 but generally, claims are for prop-

erty damages, compensating for temporary, continuing or permanent
injuries, depending upon the circumstances of the case. 9 Temporary
injury may occur in some nuisance cases, especially in cases where the
future objectionable conduct of the defendant is enjoined. 9 ' The injuries are continuing when the court refuses to enjoin the conduct
which is causing the nuisance and the nuisance continues, but there
is a possibility that it will be discontinued in the future.'92 With both
temporary and continuing injuries, the court measures damages by the
amount of the loss suffered and proved by the plaintiff; " and in the
case of a continuing injury, the plaintiff may bring actions periodically for the damages accrued since his last action' 94 or the period
186. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.010 (1957). See Note, Damages for Private Nuisance,
30 WASH. L. REV. 126 (1955); Comment, Recovery of Damages for Private Nuisance,
18 WASH. L. REv. 31 (1943).
187. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.180 (1957).
188. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952);
Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 P. 306 (1924).
189. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 45 Wn. 2d 346, 353, 274 P.2d 574,
578 (1954), quoting Annot. 142 A.L.R. 1307, 1322 (1943), states the rule:
The question whether an occupant of real estate (whether owner or not) may
recover damages for discomfort, annoyance, etc., personally resulting to him from
a nuisance, in addition to, or separate from, any sort of property damages, is
most distinctly presented in cases where the claim for the personal damages is
accompanied by a claim for depreciation in rental or use value of the premises.
In most jurisdictions the rule is that the personal damages are recoverable in
addition to, or separate from, damages for diminution in rental or use value.
This rule seems clearly to involve the idea that the law will not presume that one
responsible for a temporary nuisance will continue it, and will not require the
occupant of premises to abandon them to avoid consequences to his person.
This court has recognized that recovery may be had for "sickness, suffering,
mental anguish and bodily infirmities" resulting from nuisance, in addition to
property damage.
190. Nominal damages may also be awarded. See Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn. 2d 815,
296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
191. See Forbus v. Knight, 24 Wn. 2d 297, 163 P.2d 822 (1945); Ehorn v.
Northwest Magnesite Co., 131 Wash. 270, 230 P. 419 (1924).
WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.48.010 (1957) provides for "damages and other and further
relief." The statute thus clearly contemplates damages in addition to injunctive relief.
192. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952);
Weller v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 155 Wash. 526, 285 P. 446 (1930).
193. See Bowman v. Helser, 143 Wash. 397, 255 P. 146 (1927); cases cited in
notes 191, 192, supra.
194. In actions subsequent to the initial action, the plaintiff may be able to rely
on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to establish the existence of the nuisance. Compare
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barred by the statute of limitations. 195 If there is virtually no possibility
that the nuisance will be discontinued in the foreseeable future, the

court may award permanent damages, amounting to the reduction in
the market value of the plaintiff's property caused by the nuisance.1 9
In any case, the amount of damages need not be proved in an exact
amount if the court can determine the loss to the plaintiff with reason-

able certainty.

97

4. Declaratory Judgment
Washington has adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
which provides: 9 8
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether

or not further relief is or could be claimed. An action or proceeding shall not be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be

either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or

decree.
There would seem to be little advantage in bringing a declaratory judgment action in most nuisance cases since damages or injunctive re-

Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 57 Wn. 2d 619, 358 P.2d 975 (1961) with Riblet v. Ideal
Cement Co., 54 Wn. 2d 779, 345 P.2d 173 (1950) and Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559,
564, 392 P.2d 808, 811 (1964).
195. The applicable statute of limitations is two years. WASH. REv. CoDE § 4.16.130
(1956). But the cause of action is treated as accruing at the time of the interference
with the plaintiff's property, so that with a continuing nuisance, the statute bars
only those damages accruing more than two years before the action is brought, rather
than barring the action itself. See Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn. 2d
249, 258, 248 P.2d 380, 384-85 (1952); Weller v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 155
Wash. 526, 285 P. 446 (1930); Bowman v. Helser, 143 Wash. 397, 255 P. 146 (1927);
Sterrett v. Northport Mining and Smelting Co., 30 Wash. 164, 70 P. 266 (1902).
The court consistently refuses, to accept arguments that WAsH. RFv. CoDE
§ 4.16.080(2) (1956) (three year statute of limitations) applies, although a plausible
argument can be made for its application to at least some nuisance cases. See Riblet,
supra; notes 309-314 and accompanying text, infra.
196. See Drake v. Smith, 54 Wn. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 1059 (1959); BruskIand v. Oak
Theater, Inc., 42 Wn. 2d 346, 254 P.2d 1035 (1953); Haveman v. Beulow, 36 Wn. 2d
185, 217 P.2d 313 (1950); Haan v. Heath, 161 Wash. 128, 296 P. 816 (1931).
See generally Comment, Valuation of Real Property-Role of the Expert Witness,
44 WAsH. L. Rav. 687 (1969).
197. See Bowman v. Helser, 143 Wash. 397, 255 P. 146 (1927); Asia v. Pool,
47 Wash. 515, 92 P. 351 (1907).
198. WASH. RaV. CoDE § 7.24.010 (1956); see also WASH. Rav. CoDE §§ 7.24.020.050 (1956).
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lief are generally sought. In some respects, however, declaratory
judgment proceedings may prove to have several advantages over actions for injunctions, such as a possible right to a jury trial, absence
of bonding requirements, and non-availability of equitable defenses.
The use of the declaratory judgment procedure should also be considered by potential defendants who are uneasy about risking substantial
capital investments in developments which may be declared nuisances
or who may wish to litigate numerous complex issues in a situation
in which their conduct may create a nuisance. 199
5. Parties
An "action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance,"2 ' although, as a practical matter, only a person with an interest in property may be capable of proving private nuisance, since
nuisances which affect non-property owners will generally affect
"equally the rights of an entire community or neighborhood," thus
being public nuisances.2 01 Class actions for private nuisance would
seem to be theoretically possible, but class actions may only be
brought if "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

199. See, e.g., Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248
(1968).
200. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.020 (1957).
201. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.130 (1957).
It is quite clear that owners [Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn.
2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952)], lessees [Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83 P. 14
(1905)], and licensees [McInnes v. Kennell, 47 Wn. 2d 29, 286 P.2d 713 (1955);
Shew v. Hartnett, 121 Wash. 1, 208 P. 60 (1922)], may bring private nuisance actions
for interferences with real property in their possession. Even so, if a neighborhood is
affected by a nuisance, it will probably be a public nuisance. Cf. Harris v. Skirving,
41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952).
Actions brought by persons other than those who have interests in land are generally
based on a right (but not injury, because of the special injury requirement) held in common by the public. Compare Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952) and
Bales v. Tacoma, 172 Wash. 494, 20 P.2d 860 (1933) with Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn. 2d
530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955) and Lampa v. Graham, 179 Wash. 184, 36 P.2d 543 (1934).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) provides:
For a private nuisance there is liability only to those who have property rights
and privileges in respect to the use and enjoyment of land affected, including
(a) possessors of the land,
(b) owners of easements and profits in the land, and
(c) owners of non-possessory estates in the land which are detrimentally affected
by interferences with its use and enjoyment.
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impracticable,1 20 2 which would suggest that virtually all class actions
would be for public nuisances.
A landowner is, of course, liable for using his land in a manner
causing a private nuisance, 203 as are successive owners who neglect
to abate a continuing nuisance caused by a former owner.20 4 Lessees
and licensees creating nuisances by their use of property have also
been held liable by the Washington court.2 5 Liability of a landlord
for nuisance, as a general rule, depends upon his duty to make repairs 208 or his contemplation of an improper use of the property by
the lessee. 0 7 Landlord liability cases suggest that great care is required to ascertain the duties and liabilities of the landlord in each
case. 0 8 Private nuisance actions have been upheld against cities,20 9

202. WASHr. Civ. R. SuPER. CT. 23(a). Rule 23 also prescribes additional requirements
for class actions.
203. See Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wn. 2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964); Riblet v. SpokanePortland Cement Co., 4-1 Wn. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952).
204. WAsH. REV. CODE § 7.48.170 (1957) provides:
Every successive owner of property who neglects to abate a continuing nuisance
upon, or in the use of such property caused by a former owner, is liable therefor
in the same manner as the one who first created it.
Collateral estoppel may also apply to successive owners. See note 194, supra.
205. See Ridpath v. Spokane Stamp Works, 48 Wash. 320, 93 P. 416 (1908);
Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83 P. 14 (1905); State ex rel. Dow v. Nichols,
83 Wash. 676, 145 P. 986 (1915) (public nuisance) (lessees); Great Northern Ry. v.
Oakley, 135 Wash. 279, 237 P. 990 (1925) (licensee under contract to cut timber).
As to lessees, see cases cited notes 206-208, infra.
206. See Ward v. Hinkleman, 37 Wash. 375, 79 P. 956 (1905).
207. See Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wn. 2d 38, 43-44, 253 P.2d 427, 430 (1953).
208. See Flannery v. Nelson, 59 Wn. 2d 120, 366 P.2d 329 (1961) ; Shew v. Hartnett,
121 Wash. 1, 208 P. 60 (1922).
WAsH. Ray. CODE § 59.12.030 (1958) provides:
A tenant of real property for a term less than life is guilty of unlawful detainer
(5) When he . . erects, suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the
premises any nuisance, and remains in possession after the service (in manner in
RCW 59.12.040 provided) upon him of three days notice to quit ....
If the landlord has knowledge that the tenant is creating a nuisance, he can thus
prevent the nuisance by bringing an unlawful detainer action, and this power would
seem to offer the basis for a strong argument that the landlord be liable for such a
nuisance if he fails to take such action.
See generally Comment, Duty of a Landlord to Third Persons Outside the Premises,
9 WAsH. L. REv. 217 (1934).
209. Southworth v. Seattle, 145 Wash. 138, 259 P. 26 (1927); Ferry v. Seattle,
116 Wash. 648, 200 P. 336 (1921), rehearing 116 Wash. 661, 203 P. 40 (1921).
Immunity of cities from certain types of tort actions, not including nuisance actions,
raised an issue in several cases as to the real character of the action, i.e., nuisance or
negligence. See, e.g., Macy v. Chelan, 59 Wn. 2d 610, 369 P.2d 508 (1962). But the
immunity of cities from tort liability was seriously eroded in Kelso v. Tacoma, 63 Wn.
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counties, 210 and the state, 21 ' and recent statutes make it clear that
any of these governmental entities may be found liable for private
nuisance. 1212 The federal government might be found liable for a nuisance, but a careful analysis of decisional law and constitutional and
statutory provisions is required before evaluating any given case.21 s

2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964) and Hosea v. Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 678, 393 P.2d 967 (1964);
it was clearly extinguished by WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (1967), which provides:
All political subdivisions, municipal corporations, and quasi municipal corporations
of the state, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be
liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct
of their officers, agents or employees to the same extent as if they were a private
person or corporation: Provided, That the filing within the time allowed by law
of any claim required shall be a condition precedent to the maintaining of any
action ...
See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.96.020 (1967) (filing claims).
210. Peterson v. King County, 45 Wn. 2d 860, 278 P.2d 774 (1954). See WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 4.96.010, .020 (1967) (discussed in note 209, supra).
211. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1969) provides:
The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary
capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same
extent as if it were a private person or corporation.
See Ames Lake Community Club v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 769, 420 P.2d 363 (1966);
Deaconess Hospital v. Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn. 2d 378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965).
212. See notes 209-211, supra, for discussion of statutes. These statutes apply
expressly to damages, leaving open the question of injunctive relief; but the immunity
argument should be ineffective in equity as it is in law, and the express right to bring
a legal action should be construed as including the right to bring an action in equity.
Cf. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 2 (one form of civil action). On the other hand, the
public interest in the governmental activity sought to be enjoined may justify a refusal
to grant injunctive relief in particular cases; and as a practical matter refusal to
enjoin would seem to be appropriate in most cases where a municipality has the
power of eminent domain by which it could acquire the right to damage the
plaintiff's property. See Snavely v. Goldendale, 10 Wn. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941)
notes 314-322 and accompanying text, infra.
213. Certain non-tort actions may be brought against the United States under
the Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). Nuisance actions could conceivably be construed to be covered by the Act
if they are based upon constitutional grounds. See notes 314-322 and accompanying
text, infra. But the federal constitution's requirement of just compensation applies only
to the taking of property, not damaging, and the courts have accordingly rejected claims
of damaging under the constitution and the Act. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d
580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 925
(1963), noted in 16 VAND. L. REV. 430 (1963).
Certain tort actions against the United States have been authorized by the Federal
Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842, as amended by the Act of 1947,
ch. 446, 61 Stat. 722 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Nuisance actions of certain types are probably authorized by this statute; however,
the complex history and dynamic judicial development of the Act require careful
scrutiny before evaluating any particular case. It would seem that the trend is toward
a more liberal application of the Act. The Court in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) stated: "There is no justification for this court to read
exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress." Subsequent to that case,
numerous procedural amendments were enacted by Congress. See Jacoby, The 89th
Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLTtM. L. REV. 1212 (1967). But extensive
research of decisional law is still required to ascertain the actionability of particular

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
In many cases involving pollution, the injury to the plaintiff is
caused by a number of polluters who individually contribute pollutants which cumulatively cause the injury. In these cases, an individual
polluter may be found liable for his contribution to the pollution if
the extent of the injury caused by his contribution can be ascertained;
however, this causal connection is generally so obscure that it poses
a serious and possibly insurmountable proof problem.21 4 Where apportionment to the contributors is not possible, Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tentative Draft) suggest that the defendant must prove the extent of his contribution or be liable for the
entire injury.2 15 The Restatement Draft cites a Washington case to
support this proposition; 2 16 however, the cited case was clearly identified by the court as a non-nuisance case,217 and the court strongly
suggested that it would apply the same rule to nuisance cases that it
had applied in the past 21 Prior cases held that where a plaintiff was
in doubt as to the contributions of a number of independent pollutors, the plaintiff had the burden of proving the extent of the injury
caused by each, and failure to carry that burden resulted in no liability of any of the pollutors, since they were severally, not jointly,
liable.21 ' While this probably reflects the current Washington position,

torts. See generally Steffen, A Federal Tort Claims Act Tort, 34 TENN. L. REv. 367
(1967); Symposium on Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 FED. B.J. 1 (1966); Abend,
Federal Liability for Takings and Torts: An Anomalous Relationship, 31 FORD. L. REv.
481 (1963).
214. See, e.g., Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wn. 2d 38, 253 P.2d 427 (1953).
215. See PaossER 628-29 (3d. ed. 1964); REsTATExEN (SEcoN) oF TORTS § 840E,
comment c (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969).
216. IZESTATEiMNT (SEcoND) Or TORTS 134 (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) citing
Robillard v. Selah-Moxie Irr. Dist., 54 Wn. 2d 582, 343 P.2d 565 (1959).
217. Robillard v. Selah-Moxie Irr. Dist., 54 Wn. 2d 582, 583-84, 343 P.2d 565, 566
(1959) states: "We are not concerned with a nuisance in the instant case."
218. Id. The court concluded that the rule applicable to nuisances was stated in
REsTATna3IEN OF TORTS § 881 (1939) as follows:
Where two or more persons, each acting independently, create or maintain a
situation which is a tortious invasion . . . each is liable only for such proportion
of the harm caused to the land or of the loss of enjoyment of it by the owner
as his contribution to the harm bears to the total harm.
It then distinguished the case as not being a nuisance case, and applied the rule found
in REsTATEmENT or TORTS § 879 (1939):
Except as stated in § 881, each of two persons who is independently guilty of
tortious conduct which is a substantial factor in causing harm to another is liable
for the entire harm, in the absence of a superseding cause.
219. Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wn. 2d 38, 253 P.2d 427 (1953) affirmed dismissal of a
nuisance action. The court addressed itself to the question of joint or several liability
of the defendants at 43, stating:
In her complaint, appellant alleged that she was in doubt as to the person or
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joint liability would appear to be more desirable in cases where some
harm is proved as to each defendant because (1) plaintiffs will otherwise be left without recourse in many cases where they cannot hope
to prove the extent of injury caused by each polluter and (2) the
polluters in such cases are in a better position than is the plaintiff
20
to present evidence as to their contributions to the pollution.

persons from whom she was entitled to redress, and for that reason she was
joining all of the named defendants. Such procedure is appropriate where, as here,
it is alleged that the pollution comes from several independent sources. In such
case the liability of those contributing to the injury is several. Snavely v.
Goldendale, [10 Wn. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941)].
This, however, does not not relieve a plaintiff from the burden of proving that
a particular defendant, whose liability is several rather than joint, caused damage
to plaintiff in a specified amount. The difficulty of making such a showing is
readily recognized. Unless it is done, however, the trial court has no basis in the
evidence for allocating total damage between a number of severally-liable
trespassers, tortfeasors, or creators of a nuisance.
The Snavely case, on which the court relies, stated its reasons for permitting joindex
of a number of polluters of a stream, at 458-59:
The only sound reason for the . . . rule is that the liability of those contributing
to the injury is several. Some of the decisions applying the [contrary] rule refer
to the liability as being joint and several. To this we cannot agree, for, obviously,
it might work great injustice to hold one responsible for the entire injurious effect
of the pollution of a stream brought about by himself and others in varying
degrees. But the several liability of such tort-feasors can be as well determined in
one action as in many. Indeed, it seems to us that the extent of responsibility of
each of the persons liable may be more accurately and justly determined in an action
in which they are all defendants ....
For a subsequent statement and application of this rule, see Getzendaner v. Unite
Pac. Ins. Co., 52 Wn. 2d 61, 322 P.2d 1089 (1958). See also PROSSER at 252; WAsi
Civ. R. SUPER, CT. 20(a) (permissive joinder).
Robillard v. Selah-Moxee Irr. Dist., 54 Wn. 2d 582, 343 P.2d 565 (1959) could I
construed as seriously eroding the position taken in Maas and Snavely because it is
negligence action (as was Getzendaner) which could have been argued on a nuisan
theory. Attempts to use this argument are extremely precarious, however, because
the clear distinction between nuisance and non-nuisance actions made by the cou
See note 217, supra.
220. As to the first proposition see Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wn. 2d 38, 253 P.2d 4
(1953).
PROSSER, at 254, comments on the several liability rule:
There has remained . . . enough in the way of real difficulty experienced, an(
possible injustice feared, to lead several writers to urge that in any case wher
two or more defendants are shown to have been negligent, and to have causel
each some damage, and only the extent as to each is in question, the burden c
proof should be shifted to the defendants, and each should be held liable to th
extent that he cannot produce evidence to limit his liability. The justification fc
this rests upon the fact that a choice must be made, as to where the loss due t
failure of proof shall fall, between an entirely innocent plaintiff and defendan
who are clearly proven to have been at fault, and to have done him harm.
See Wigmore, Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages Making the Innocent P
Suffer without Redress, 17 ILL. L. Rav. 458 (1923); Jackson, Joint Torts and Set
Liability, 17 Tex. L. Rav. 399 (1939).
Plaintiffs might also argue for application of the doctrine of res losa loquitu
pollution cases which are based on negligence. See Porter, The Role of Private Nuis

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
II. PUBLIC NUISANCE
A. The Concept of Public Nuisance
1. Development of the Concept of Public Nuisance
By the thirteenth century, a number of offenses whose common
element was obstruction, inconvenience, or damage to the public were
identified as public nuisances. 22 1 Governmental action, in the form of
abatement or indictment, was the exclusive remedy for public nuisance
until the sixteenth century, when the common law courts recognized
damage actions by plaintiffs suffering special injury distinct from the
public in general. 2 The requirement of special injury was apparently
derived from the belief that the attorney general or a public representative should seek redress for wrongs to the public, rather than
22
every individual who was adversely affected by the wrong.
Blackstone defined public or common nuisances as "such inconvenience or troublesome offenses, as annoy the whole community in general, and not merely some particular person." 4 This broad definition
suffers from the same degree of over-generalization as did the definitions of private nuisance discussed above, 225 but the extreme sensitivity of the courts to the circumstances surrounding each case and their
resulting refusal to decide such cases on the basis of a system of articLaw in the Control of Air Pollution, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 107, 113 n.27 (1968). If the
polluter knows of the dangerous nature of the pollutants, yet allows them to escape,
a nuisance action based on negligence and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has been permitted by some courts. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide,
258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958). If these arguments fail, the plaintiff in any event will
probably be successful in arguing for a fairly liberal standard of proof where he retains
the burden of proving the amount of injury caused by each polluter. See Bales v.
Tacoma, 172 Wash. 494, 502, 20 P.2d 860, 863 (1933); Park v. Northport Smelting
& Refining Co., 47 Wash. 597, 602, 92 P. 442, 444 (1907).
221. J. FLEMING, THm LAW Or ToRTs 365-66 (3d ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 821B, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969).
222. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF ToRTS 365-66 (3d ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) or ToRTs § 821C, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969).
223. J. FLEMmG, TBE LAW oF TORTS 367 (3d ed. 1965). For a recent discussion of
the "special" or "particular" damage requirement, see Prosser, Private Action for
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966).
224. 4 IV. BLACKSTONE, COa3mNrAIxS *167.
For early cases using this definition, see JOYCE, supra note 16, at 13-14 n.20. For
other "classie' definitions, see RESTATEZENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 821B, Note 2 to
Institute (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969).
225. See note 21 and accompanying text, supra.
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ulated rules make such over-generalization necessary. 22 An additional
difficulty with attempts to define public nuisance precisely is that it
is frequently defined by statute,22 7 and, in addition, statutes quite
often identify particular types of conduct which constitute public nuisances, 2 - thus making attempts to generalize about the elements of
public nuisance virtually impossible. Statutory development of public
nuisance law is a legitimate outgrowth of the public nature of the
offenses represented thereby and the fact that such offenses are frequently, if not always, crimes. 22

9

The pervasiveness of criminal sanc-

tions against public nuisances is suggested by the Restatement (Sec23 0
ond) of Torts (Tentative Draft), which states:
A public nuisance is a criminal interference with a right common to all members of the public.
This definition is perhaps justified by the abundant authority cited
by the Reporter;

21

however, an alternative definition seems to be a

more accurate statement of the common law concept as most recently
stated by the English courts and the concept provided for by a number
of state statutes. This concept was stated in 1957 by Denning, L.
J. : 232

226. See J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 369 (3d ed. 1965); notes 22, 23 and
accompanying text, supra.
227. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821B, comment c (Tent. Draft
No. 15, 1969); JoYcE, supra note 16, at § 7.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 15,
1969).
229. Id. § 821B, comments d, e.
230. Id. § 821B.
231. Id. § 821B, Note 1 to the Institute.
232. A. G. v. P.Y.A. Quarries, Ltd., 2 Q.B. 169, 191, 1 All E.R. 894 (1957). Romer,
L.J., expressed the same general conclusion at 902:
[A]ny nuisance is "public" which materially affects the reasonable comfort and
convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects. The sphere of the nuisance
may be described generally as "the neighborhood"....
The opinions in this case appear to reflect the current state of the common law, and
they have received considerable attention from the common law writers. See H. STREET,
THE LAW OF TORTS 238 (3d ed. 1963); Nuisance: Public or Private: Quarry, 101 SoL.
J. 338 (1957) ; Nuisance: What is a Public Nuisance, 33 N.Z.L.J. 229 (1957) ; Nuisance:
Public and Private Nuisance Distinguished, 74 S.A.L.J. 339 (1957); Comment, Common
Law Remedy Effective Alternative to Municipal Legislation, 43 CAN. B.J. 100, 105-06
(1965).
This concept seems to reflect the basic notion of public nuisance suggested by
Cardozo, J., in People v. Rubenfeld, 254 NY. 245, 172 N.E. 485, 486 (1930), quoted in
State ex rel. Tollefson v. Mitchell, 25 Wn. 2d 476, 479, 171 P.2d 245, 246 (1946), which
recognizes the criminal provisions relating to the wrong, but also attempts to identify
distinctions between the persons affected by the wrong:

Nuisance as a Land Use Control
A public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its
range or so indiscriminate in its effects that it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own
responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on
the responsibility of the community at large.
2. The Washington Concept of Public Nuisance
Under Washington statutes, a public nuisance is any nuisance233
"which affects equally the rights of an entire community or neighborhood, although the extent of the damage may be unequal.

'2 4

This

definition, taken together with other statutory provisions, suggests
that the basic difference between private and public nuisance is the
number of persons or properties which are affected by a particular
interference, 2 5 and that many of the basic concepts applicable to

By the Penal Law of the State, an act which "annoys, injures or endangers the
comfort, repose, health or safety of any considerable number of persons" is dedared to be "a public nuisance," and punishable as a crime. . . . The definition
corresponds to the distinction between public and private nuisances as it stood at
common law. . . . To be reckoned as "considerable," the number of persons need
not be shown to be "very great". . . . Enough that so many are touched by the
offense and in ways so indiscriminate and general that the multiplied annoyance may
not unreasonably be classified as a wrong to the community. Public is the nuisance
whereby "a public right or privilege common to every person in the community is
interrupted or interfered with," as by the obstruction of a public way.. . . Public
also is the nuisance committed "in such place and in such manner that the aggregation of private injuries becomes so great and extensive as to constitute a public
annoyance and inconvenience, and a wrong against the community, which may be
properly the subject of a public prosecution". . . . (Emphasis added).
Public nuisances are subject to remedial actions of many types other than imposition
of criminal sanctions. See -notes 279-306 and accompanying text, infra. It seems
unnecessary to identify such nuisances as "criminal" interferences, as the Tentative Draft
of the RESTATEME T (SEcoND) Or TORTs does. The term "criminal" fails to add any
descriptive element to the definition which is of any aid in identifying an interference
which constitutes a public nuisance. In addition, the limitation to "criminal" interferences
might have the undesirable effect of restricting the development of the concept of public
nuisance and the range of remedial systems which could be developed to prevent and
control public nuisances. In this regard, there is no need to provide for criminal sanctions
for certain types of nuisances, and it might be desirable to abandon criminal sanctions in
an effort to develop an enforcement system based largely on civil remedies. In short, the
essential characteristic of public nuisance seems to be, and should be, the right and duty
of public officials to take remedial action, not their right and duty to bring a criminal
prosecution.
233. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.48.120 (1957) defines "nuisance" without distinguishing
between private and public nuisances. See text accompanying note 27, supra.
234. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.48.130 (1957).
235. In this regard, Washington law seems to be more clear than the law of many
other jurisdictions. Most authorities conclude that public nuisances must be interferences
with rights common to the public rather than the individual rights of a large number
of persons. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (Tent. Draft No. 15, (1969);
PRossER at 606-07. But comment g of the Tentative Draft recognizes statutes such as
Washington's creating the contrary rule:
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private nuisance also apply to public nuisance.3 6 The criminal statutes further develop the concept of public nuisance:237
A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy
of the state....
Every act unlawfully done and every omission to perform a
duty, which act or omission
(1) Shall annoy, injure or endanger the safety, health, comfort, or repose of any considerable number of persons; or,
(2) Shall offend public decency; or,
(3) Shall unlawfully interfere with, befoul, obstruct, or tend
to obstruct, or render dangerous for passage, a lake, navigable
Except as may be provided by statute, a private nuisance does not become a public
nuisance merely because it interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by a large
number of persons. There must be interference with a public right ...
It should be noted, however, that in a small number of states, such as New York
and Oklahoma, there are statutes defining a public nuisance to include interference
with "any considerable number of persons," and under these statutes no public right,
as such, need be involved.
A "Note to the Institute" then cites cases in "non-statute" states to the same effect
as the statutes. The citations in the note suggest that there is authority for the "considerable number of persons" concept of public nuisance in the District of Columbia,
Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, and South Carolina. In addition to New York [N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 1967)] and Oklahoma [OILA. STAT. ANNOT. tit. 50,
§ 2 (1962)], statutes in California [CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1955)], Idaho [IDAHo
CODE § 18-5901 (1948)], and Washington provide for the "considerable number of
persons" test, thus making at least ten jurisdictions in the United States which probably
do not require injury to a public right for public nuisances. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.66.010
(1957) refers to the rights of a "considerable number of persons" twice in identifying
public nuisances, and this, along with WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.130 (1957), makes the
Washington position clear.
236. The court sometimes refers to "nuisance" throughout an opinion, without ever
stating whether the case involves a private or public nuisance; and in most cases, the
term "nuisance" is frequently used, making it difficult at times to determine whether the
rule stated is intended to be applicable to private nuisance, public nuisance, or both. See
Carlson v. Wenatchee, 56 Wn. 2d 932, 350 P.2d 457 (1960) ; Linsler v. Booth Undertaking
Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 P. 976 (1922); Hughes v. McVay, 113 Wash. 333, 194 P. 565
(1920).
The nuisance statutes are equally unclear, frequently referring only to "*nuisance"
in some, but not all, cases, in a context suggesting that they apply only to private or
public nuisances. See, e.g., WAsr. REv. CODE §§ 7.48.010, .050, .120, .160, .170, .180, .240,
.280 (1957).
Part of the reason for the failure to distinguish private and public nuisances is that
for some purposes, the principles and rules set forth in a statute or court decision are
applicable to both types. This comment accordingly uses the term "nuisance" where the
principle or rule seems to be applicable to both, or where the context otherwise indicates
the intended application of the term.
237. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.66.010 (1957). Note that part (4) of this enumeration
strengthens the conclusion that the basic difference between private and public nuisance
is the number of persons or properties which are affected by a particular interference.
WAsr. REV. CODE § 9.66.020 (1957) continues:
An act which affects a considerable number of persons in any of the ways specified
in RCW 9.66.010 is not less a public nuisance because the extent of the damage is
unequal.
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river, bay, stream, canal or basin, or a public park, square,
street, alley or highway; or,
(4) Shall in any way render a considerable number of persons
insecure in life or the use of property;
Shall be public nuisance.
The statutory scheme described above has been construed by the
Washington court as being "largely declaratory of the common law"
of public nuisance, and as such, sufficiently specific to "apprise a
defendant with reasonable certainty of the nature of the offense.... "23
The general concept of public nuisance is thus embodied to a large
extent in decisional law;23 9 however, the numerous statutes declaring
particular conduct, places, and things to be public nuisances 40 re-

238. State v. Primeau, 70 Wn. 2d 109, 112-13, 422 P.2d 302, 304-05 (1966) summarizes
the court's position:
Statutes purporting to denounce public nuisances are usually couched in general
language, but if the wording apprises a person of common understanding of the
conduct sought to be proscribed, then it is not too vague or indefinite to meet the
constitutional tests. The language of RCW 9.66.010 as here invoked, does, we
think, inform a person of ordinary understanding that one commits a nuisance,
i.e., a crime gainst the order and economy of the state, by committing any acts in
an unlawful manner in such a way as to annoy, injure or endanger the comfort,
repose, or health of any considerable number of persons.
The wording of the statute, although broader in at least one respect, seems largely
declaratory of the common law, and, thus, for many years has been deemed
sufficiently specific to define a nuisance to persons of ordinary understanding ...
Although the charge must apprise a defendant with reasonable certainty of the
nature of the offense, it is usually deemed sufficient if it enables him to prepare
his defense and plead any judgment in bar to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense....
239. Much of the decisional law discussed under the heading "private nuisance," supra,
is applicable to the law of public nuisance as well. See notes 241-245 and accompanying
text, infra.

240. See notes 253-268 and accompanying text, infra.
Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn. 2d 405, 420, 439 P.2d 248, 257-58 (1968)
quoting Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn. 2d 425, 431, 353 P.2d 941, 945 (1960), cert. den. 364

U.S. 932 (1961), suggests the permissible range of legislative enactments relating to
public nuisance by the court's view of the scope of the "police power":

It must be borne in mind that the state constitution is not a grant, but a restriction
on the law-making power, and the power of the legislature to enact all reasonable
laws is unrestrained except where, either expressly or by fair inference, it is pro-

hibited by the state and federal constitutions. Where the validity of a statute
is assailed, there is a presumption of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment, unless its repugnancy to the constitution clearly appears or is made to appear
beyond a reasonable doubt....
Markham contains a thorough discussion of the relationship between the "police power"
and public nuisance law, and upholds the Washington Highway Advertising Control Act
of 1961 as amended, and certain regulations adopted thereunder. WASH. Rav. CODE ch.
47.42 (1961). It would seem that substantial doubts as to the validity of certain
prohibitions of the nuisance statutes would result from certain'court decisions, however,
such as those relating to the constitutionality of statutes rdlating to vagrancy and
"status crimes." See generally A. Cdomo, Mens Rea and Stdtu Criniinality, 40-So. CA~ir.
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quire that the basic content of public nuisance law be sought in both
the decisional law of nuisance and the statutes which have been
enacted to implement, modify, and expand the decisional law.
B. Actionable Public Nuisances in Washington
1. Uses and Conduct Neither Prohibited Nor Authorized by Statute
or Ordinance
In the absence of a statute declaring that particular conduct is a
public nuisance, the basic substantive inquiry is the same as that for
private nuisance,2 41 except that the unreasonable interference must
affect "equally the rights of an entire community or neighbor'
Therefore, the factors considered by the courts in deciding
hood."242
whether there is an "unreasonable interference" are of basic relevance
in public nuisance cases.243 In deciding whether a public nuisance exists, the court may also consider the doctrine of nuisance per se, the
character of the neighborhood, the sequence of events, and the defendant's capacity to control objectionable effects; 244 however, these

factors will probably be of less significance than in private nuisance
cases because of the existence and importance of public policy, statutes, and ordinances relating to the particular use or conduct complained of.245
2. Uses and Conduct Authorized by Statute or Ordinance
By statute, "nothing which is done or maintained under the exL. REv. 463 (1967); J. MuRTAGH, Status Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36 FORD. L.
REV. 51 (1967); Note, Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REv.
782 (1968). A discussion of the possible impact of such cases is beyond the scope of this
comment.
241. See notes 34, 233 and accompanying text, supra.
or TORTS § 822, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
states that:
because of the traditional use of the one word "nuisance" to include both the public
and the private invasion, the criminal law [of public nuisance] has tended to follow
the rule [for private nuisance], although numerous special statutes have led to
departures from it.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 826, comment a, Note to Institute (Tent. Draft
No. 15, 1969).
242. See notes 234-235 and accompanying text, supra.
243. See notes 34-91, 241 and accompanying text, supra.
244. See notes 103-123 and accompanying text, supra.
245. See notes 246-269 and accompanying text, infra.
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press authority of a statute, can be deemed a nuisance." 246 This provision applies to public as well as private nuisances; 24 and municipal

ordinances which authorize a particular land use have been recognized
as precluding the finding that the use is a public nuisance,2 1 provided

that the municipality had authority to enact the ordinance. 249 But
the court has refused to give such recognition to municipal ordinances which permit interference with public rights to the special in-

jury of certain individuals
and has enjoined such uses at the instance
2
of such individuals.

"

Thus, municipalities have only limited author-

ity to identify conduct that is not to be deemed a public nuisance, as
distinguished from the state legislature's apparently absolute authority.2 51 Even so, the characterization of a particular nuisance as public
or private may be decisive in actions where a land use is permitted

by a local ordinance, since such an ordinance will probably not pre-

246. WASH. REV. CoD § 7.48.160 (1957).
247. See notes 95-100 and accompanying text, supra, for discussion of this statute and
its application to private nuisance actions.
248. Shields v. Spokane School Dist., 31 Wn. 2d 247, 254, 196 P.2d 352, 357 (1948)
adopts the following language of Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d
171, 173 (1946):
Where the legislative arm of the government has declared by statute and zoning
resolution what activities may or may not be conducted in a prescribed zone, it
has in effect declared what is or is not a public nuisance. What might have been
a proper field for judicial action prior to such legislation becomes improper when
the law-making branch of government has entered the field.
Cf. Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 P. 976 (1922); Hughes v.
McVay, 113 Wash. 333, 194 P. 565 (1920). Neither of these opinions clearly identifies
the action as a public or private nuisance action, but the number of persons affected by
the alleged interference suggests that it affected "equally the rights of an entire . . .
neighborhood," thus constituting a public nuisance. See notes 234-235 and accompanying
text, supra.
This authority of municipalities with respect -to public nuisances seems to be based
on the dominance of the public interest in such cases and the recognition of municipal
ordinances as proclamations of that interest. In this respect, private nuisances are
distinguishable, and the private relationships governed thereby should be provided for
by general statutes and decisional law rather than by municipal ordinances. See notes
3-14, 124-128 and accompanying text, supra.

249. See State ex rel. Vandervort v. Grant, 156 Wash. 96, 286 P. 63 (1930).
250. See Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952); Anderson v.
Nichols, 152 Wash. 315, 278 P. 161 (1929).
In some cases, the municipality may have authority to act, but the effects of its
action may be found to constitute a taking of private property, thus requiring that the
municipality pay just compensation. See Jacobs v. Seattle, 93 Wash. 171, 160 P. 299
(1916).
251. Of course, the state may also be found to have acted in such a manner as to take
private property for public use, thus being required to pay just compensation. -See
WASHi..Co sT. art..1, § 16.
.
.
"
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clude a finding of private nuisance but it may preclude a determination that the use is a public nuisance.2 52
3. Uses and Conduct Prohibited by Statute or Ordinance
The general nuisance statutes provide that certain conduct constitutes a public nuisance. These statutes deal with such matters as
houses of prostitution,25 3 gambling establishments, 54 places where
intoxicating liquors are illegally kept or sold or fighting is conducted,255 places where drugs are used, 256 and places where vagrants
resort. 257 In addition, the public interest in health and safety is reflected by declarations that health and safety hazards of various kinds
constitute public nuisances.5 8 Littering is similarly prohibited. 25 9 In
addition to these extensive declarations in the general nuisance statutes, there are numerous statutes scattered throughout the Revised
Code of Washington that declare certain conduct, places, or things
offensive to public health and safety 260 and the general welfare 261 to

be public nuisances.

252. Compare cases cited in note 248, supra, with cases cited in note 98, supra.
253. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.48.050, .240 (1957). WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.120 (1957)
identifies as a nuisance "doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, which act or
omission ...

offends decency ...

"

254.
255.
256.

WASH. Rv. CODE §§ 7.48.240, 9.66.010 (1957); 67.16.060 (1958) (horse races).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.48.140 (8) (1957); 66.36.010 (1961).
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.48.240, (1957); 69.33.340 (1959); 69.40.080 (1969).

257.

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.66.010(4)

258.

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.48.010, .140, (1957); 9.66.050 (1957).

259.

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.66.060, .070 (1967).

(1957).

260. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 16.13.020 (1957) (animals running at large); 14.08.030(4)
(1959) (structures, animals or plants encroaching upon airport protection privileges);
68.48.040 (1958) (cemeteries established in violation of statutes); 69.24.400(1) (1958)
(eggs prepared or distributed in violation of statute) ; 70.20.170 (1958) (sources of filth
or other causes of sickness found on private property); 68.28.060 (1958) (mausoleums or
columbariums erected in violation of statute); 17.28.170 (1959), 70.22.050(2) (1967)
(breeding places for mosquitoes); 86.15.090 (1961) (structures and accumulations of
material which materially contribute to the dangers of loss of life or property from flood
waters and which endanger the public health or safety) ; 86.16.090 (1961) (structures or
works violating orders of the state supervisor of flood control); 76.04.380 (1959) (uncontrolled fires on forest land with no proper action to prevent their spread) ; 47.32.130
(1961) (structures or objects which threaten or endanger highways and persons travelling
thereon) ; 47.36.180 (1961) (devices visible from highways, streets, or roads which
endanger traffic); 46.61.075 (1967) (signs or devices which imitate or resemble traffic
control devices); 90.03.350 (1961) (dams or controlling works constructed or modified
without plans approved by the department of water resources).
261. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.04.100 (1958)
(adulterated or misbranded articles in
intrastate commerce) ; 75.20.060 (1955), 77.16.210 (1957) (dams or obstructions of
streams without satisfactory fishways); 33.08.010 (1959) (business names in violation of
savings and loan statutes); 77.12.130 (1955) (devices for catching game or fish in
violation of law); 76.06.010 (1958) (forest insects and tree diseases which threaten
permanent timber production); 15.17.200 (1969) (horticultural -facilities violating-statutes
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Statutes also provide that first and second class cities have the
power "to declare what shall be a nuisance. ' 262 A similar authority
can be implied in the case of towns and third class cities by the stat23
utory provision that:
Every act or thing done or being within the limits of a third
class city [or town] which is declared by law or by ordinance to
be a nuisance shall be so considered in all actions and proceedings.
Towns and cities also have general statutory authority to enact ordi65
nances,2 64 and counties have broad statutory powers to:2
[M]ake and enforce, by appropriate resolutions or ordinances,
all such police and sanitary regulations as are not in conflict with
state law....
Thus, ordinances of municipalities may identify particular conduct,
places, or things which are public nuisances. 0 6 While there is little
or rules); 15.60.080 (1961) (apiaries in which diseased bees are found or which are
constructed so as to hinder inspection); 15.08.010, .090, .190, .210 (1961) (plants,
produce or property in a commercial area upon which are found pests or diseases injurious to nursery stock, fruit, and vegetables) ; 47.42.080 (1961) (advertising signs along

highways in violation of law); 47.32.120 (1961) (structures or businesses making use
or tending to invite patrons to make use of highway rights-of-way).
262. WASHr. REV. CODE § 35.22.280 (1965) provides:
Any city of the first class shall have the power:
(1) . . . To declare what shall be deemed nuisance and to abate nuisances at
the expense of the parties creating, causing or committing or maintaining the same,
and to levy 'a special assessment on the land- or premises whereon the nuisance is
situated to defray the cost or to reimburse the city for the cost of abating the
same.
These statutes do not expressly restrict their applicability to public nuisances, but the
context suggests that they are intended to apply thereto and not, to private nuisances.
263. WAsmE. REv. CODE §§ 35.24.330, 35.27.410 (1965). Each of these sections continues:
"All remedies given by law for the prevention and abatement of nuisances shall apply
thereto."
264. WAsr. REv. CODE §§ 35.22.200, .570 (1965) (first class cities); 35.23.440(1)
(1965) (second class cities) ; 35.24.290(1), (1965) (third class cities); 35.27.370(1) (1965)
(towns).
265. WAsne. REv. CODE § 36.32.120(7) (1967).
266. See note 268, infra, which notes that municipalities probably cannot declare
invasions of private rights to be public nuisances. A fortiori, municipalities should not
have the power to declare invasions of private rights to be private nuisances, and no
cases so holding have been found. But see note 269, infra.
A collection of selected nuisance ordinances dealing with buildings and structures,
weeds, trees and other vegetation, noise, air pollution, animals, fowl and bees, encroachments on streets and sidewalks, and junk yards is found in E. CANPBELL, G. Sarr, AN
H. OLsoN, NinsANc s-Thm CONTROL AND ABATEMENT MNTHE STATE OF WASMmNGTON
app. A (1949). These ordinances might be of considerable assistance to the draftsman,
and the publication containing them is available from the Bureau of Governmental
Research and Services, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98105.
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case law delimiting the scope of a municipality's power to determine
by ordinance what shall constitute a public nuisance, the cases definitely hold that there is such a limit;2 6 7 the rationale of the court ap-

pears to be that a municipality has no power to declare something
a public nuisance unless it fairly can be said to fall within the general
statutory definition of public nuisance."'
Other statutes and ordinances might also be relevant in deciding
whether a public nuisance exists, because of the general definition of
a nuisance which is premised on "unlawfully doing an act, or omitting
to perform a duty ....

*

It is readily apparent that statutes or ordi-

nances may provide that particular acts are "unlawful" or that a person has a particular "duty," and to the extent that they do, they may
provide one of the basic elements of a public nuisance action. While

267. Greenwood v. The Olympic, Inc., 51 Wn. 2d 18, 21, 315 P.2d 295, 296 (1957)
states:
If [the stairs which collapsed] became a nuisance, it was because the city council of
Seattle, by ordinance No. 72200 (the 1942 building code) declared them so to be.
A municipal ordinance may not make a thing a nuisance, unless it is in fact a
nuisance. [Emphasis added.]
See Kirkland v. Ferry, 45 Wash. 663, 664-65, 88 P. 1123, 1124 (1907), which reversed
the trial court's dismissal of an action, but suggested:
[Me are inclined to think that the town of Kirkland had no authority to pass the
ordinance in question, and to declare specifically that the building as kept was a
public nuisance.
Cf. State ex rel. Warner v. Hayes Investment Corp., 13 Wn. 2d 306, 125 P.2d 262
(1942); Manos v. Seattle, 173 Wash. 662, 24 P.2d 91 (1933); Shepard v. Seattle, 59
Wash. 363, 109 P. 1067 (1910) ; see generally Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal
Corporations in Washington, 38 WASH. L. REv. 743 (1963); 6 E. MCQUTrLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 24.58-24.92 (rev. 3d ed., 1969).
268. This would seem to be the most reasonable interpretation of the statement: "A
municipal ordinance may not make a thing a nuisance, unless it is in fact a nuisance."
Greenwood v. The Olympic, Inc., 51 Wn. 2d 18, 21, 315 P.2d 295, 296 (1957). See
notes 233-237 and accompanying text, supra (statutory definition of public nuisance).
The general limitation on police powers is that they be exercised "to promote the
public health, morals, safety, or welfare." State ex rel. Warner v. Hayes Investment
Corp., 13 Wn. 2d 306, 317, 125 P.2d 262, 266 (1942). It is probable that this limits
the power of municipalities to the declaration of invasions of public rights which are
public nuisances. The power to declare invasions of private rights public nuisances does
not extend to municipalities. See Warner, supra; Manos v. Seattle, 173 Wash. 662, 24
P.2d 91 (1933).
269. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.120 (1957). Since the quoted language is part of the
general definition of nuisance, including private nuisance, it would seem that a statute
or ordinance declaring conduct to be unlawful might also be construed to satisfy the
"unlawful" or "duty" element in a private nuisance action, as well as public. But see
note 266, supra.
270. The court rarely decides by looking for legislative declarations of "duties" and
"unlawful acts," probably because of the common law origin of the wrongs recognized
in nuisance actions. However, some cases have been decided on a strict analysis of
legislated duties and unlawful acts. See Lakoduk v. Cruger, 47 Wn. 2d 286, 287 P.2d 338
(1955).
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statutes or ordinances may identify unlawful conduct or duties, the
courts also recognize common law rights and duties as adequate bases
271
for public nuisance actions, in the absence of such enactments
C. Remedies for Public Nuisance
1. Criminal Sanctions
2 72
and: 273
Public nuisances are crimes,
[E]very person who shall commit or maintain a public nuisance, for which no special punishment is prescribed; or who
shall wilfully omit or refuse to perform any legal duty relating
to the removal of such nuisance; and every person who shall let,
or permit to be used, any building or boat, or portion thereof,
knowing that it is intended to be, or is being used, for committing or maintaining any such nuisance, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
While this statute suggests that persons in addition to property owners
who create a nuisance may be convicted of a misdemeanor, other
statutes expressly provide that criminal liability will rest on persons
who have the "care, government, management, or control" of certain
places which are public nuisances2 74 and on successive owners who
275
neglect to abate continuing nuisances.
In early cases, the Washington court clearly held that a property
owner who knew that his tenant was using property in a prohibited
manner was criminally liable for nuisance.2 7 6 The court has also held
271. See notes 241-243 and accompanying text, supra.
272. WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.66.010 (1957) provides: "A public nuisance is a crime
against the order and economy of the state."
The criminal character of the conduct, place, or thing identified in the nuisance statutes
does not depend on the criminal character of the defendant's acts under the general
criminal statutes. State v. Shanklin, 51 Wash. 35, 97 P. 969 (1908).
273. WAsir. REv. CODE § 9.66.030 (1957.
See WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 9.66.050 (1957); 9.66.070 (1967) (providing for certain
persons to be guilty of misdemeanors).
274. ,VASr. REv. CODE § 7.48.140 (1957) (applies only to public nuisances provided
for in that section).
275. WAsH. REv. CoDE § 7.48.170 (1957) states:
Every successive owner of property who neglects to abate a continuing nuisance
upon, or in the use of such property caused by a former owner, is liable therefor
in the same manner as the one who first created it.
276. State ex rel. Kern v. Jerome, 80 Wash. 261, 141 P. 753 (1914).
If the owner knows of the public nuisance, and especially if he benefits from it, it
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that a property owner cannot be subjected to criminal penalties in
the absence of his actual or constructive knowledge of the existence
of the nuisance.277 It seems that the appropriate knowledge requirement for such criminal convictions would be actual knowledge of the
acts or omissions constituting the nuisance, or knowledge of such other
78
facts as would put an ordinarily prudent man on inquiry.
The criminal code does not provide a specific punishment for public
nuisance convictions, but merely classifies the crime as a misdemeanor. 79 The general nuisance statutes, however, prescribe punishment by "a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars" where no other
punishment is specially provided. 2 This would suggest that there is

would seem that he might be found criminally liable for conspiracy. WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 9.22.010 (1956) provides:
Whenever two or more persons shall conspire-(1) To commit a crime;
Every such person shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Note that the penalty for a gross misdemeanor is fine or imprisonment, WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.92.020 (1957). Punishment is by fine only in most cases of public nuisance.
See note 281 and accompanying text, infra.
277. State ex rel. Kern v. Emerson, 90 Wash. 565, 571, 155 P. 579, 582 (1916) suggests
the extent to which constructive knowledge may be found:
The suppression of a nuisance is essentially a proceeding in rem, and to hold an
owner to constructive knowledge of the uses to which his property is put is not an
unreasonable rule, for the order of abatement operates upon the property, and not
upon the person. The suppression of a nuisance of which the owner has knowledge,
or which is so long continued and under such circumstances that knowledge will be
implied, is a burden attaching to the ownership of all property. The rule is as
old as the law of nuisance itself.
See State ex rel. Lundin v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 701, 163 P. 279 (1917).
278. WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.01.010 (1956) provides definitions and rules of construction of the criminal code. Subsection (4) provides:
The word "knowingly" imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute
the act or omission of a crime, and does not require knowledge of its unlawfulness;
knowledge of any particular fact may be inferred from the knowledge of such other
facts as should put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry.
While this standard should be applied to criminal prosecutions, it is not necessarily
appropriate for civil actions for public nuisances and will probably not be applied. See
State ex rel. Dow v. Nichols, 83 Wash. 676, 145 P. 986 (1915).
279. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.66.030 (1957). The statute applies only to public nuisances
"for which no special punishment is prescribed." It is therefore necessary to examine
remedial statutes related to the statute upon which an action is based to identify any
specific sanctions that might be provided for. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.66.060-.070
(1967); 748.050-.110 (1957).
280. WASr. REV. CODE § 7.48.250 (1957) provides:
Whoever is convicted of erecting, causing or contriving a public or common
nuisance as described in this chapter, or at common law, when the same has not been
modified or repealed by statute, where no other punishment therefor is specially
provided, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars and the
court with or without such fine, may order such nuisance to be abated, and issue
a warrant as hereinafter provided: Provided, That orders and warrants of abatement
shall not be issued by justices of the peace. (Emphasis added).
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no punishment by imprisonment except where otherwise specifically
provided."8 '
28 2

2. Civil Remedies
(a) Abatement. Abatement may be ordered by a superior court,
notwithstanding a pending or concluded criminal action.28 1 Municipalities or public officers may abate public nuisances under authority

granted them by statutes,28 4 and:285
Any person may abate a nuisance which is specially injurious
to him by removing, or if necessary, destroying the thing which
constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace,
or doing unnecessary injury.
(b) Equitable Remedies. With the exception of certain types of
nuisances, there is no express statutory authorization of actions to
enjoin public nuisances;2 6 however, the Washington court has granted
injunctive relief in public nuisance cases where such relief was deemed
appropriate under the rules of equity.8 7 The previous discussion of
281. WASH. Rav. CODE § 9.92.030 (1957) states that:
Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for which no punishment is prescribed
by any statute in force at the time of conviction and sentence, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ninety days, or by a fine
of not more than two-hundred and fifty dollars.
In view of the punishment prescribed by VAsr. REv. CODE § 7.48.250 (1957), this
statute should not generally be applied in public nuisance prosecutions. But some public
nuisances may nevertheless be expressly punishable by imprisonment. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 9.66.069-.070 (1967).
282. WASHr. RaV. CODE § 9.01.120 (1956) provides:
The omission to specify or affirm in [the criminal code] any liability to any
damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy, imposed by law, and allowed to be
recovered or enforced in any civil action or proceeding, for any act or omission
declared punishable herein, shall not affect any right to recover or enforce the same.
The criminal nature of public nuisance should accordingly have no effect on the availability of civil remedies therefor.
283. Id. WASH. Rav. CODE §§ 9.66.040 (1957); 7.48.090, .250, .260 (1957).
284. WASH. RaV. CODE § 7.48.220 (1957) provides: "A public nuisance may ble abated
by any public body or officer authorized thereto by law." See note 290, infra' a thorizations of cities and towns, prosecuting attorneys and the attorney general).
285. WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.48.230 (1957). A discussion of liability for an abatement
found to have caused "unnecessary injury" is found in Nystrand v. O'Malley, 60 Wn. 2d
792, 375 P.2d 863 (1962).
286. See, e.g., WAsH. REv. ConE § 7.48.060 (1957).
287. See Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn. 2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952); Kirkland v. Ferry,
45 Wash. 663, 88 P. 1123 (1907); Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35 Wash. 92, 76 P. 513 (1904).
Ingersoll, at 95-96 states;
[Cjourts of equity have from the earliest times exercised jurisdiction to prevent and
abate public nuisances, notwithstanding there has (sic) concurrently existed the com•mon -law remedies -of- indictment and action on the- case. The jurisdiction was
grounded on the inadequacy of the legal remedies; it being within the power-of the
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equitable remedies in private nuisance cases is applicable to public
nuisance since the equitable characteristics of the remedy govern its
application rather than the nature of the substantive claim.2 88
(c) Damages. The state, municipalities, and public officers are not
authorized to bring damage actions for public nuisances, except in
cases where a state or municipality suffers a property loss caused by
such nuisances.2 89 In cases where an individual is authorized to bring
an action for public nuisance, the principles relating to a determination
of damages are the same as those applicable to private nuisance
actions.2 9°
(d) Declaratory Judgment. The availability and utility of declaratory judgment actions relating to public nuisance are probably coextensive with that relating to private nuisance, except for the broadening impact of the following statute :291
A person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute [or] municipal ordinance . . . may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the ... statute [or] ordinance . .. and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
(e) Parties.There is no reason to expect any rule as to the civil
liability of individuals to be different in public nuisance cases from
the rules applicable to private nuisance cases.2 92 It would seem to be
possible to bring a public nuisance action against the state,293 and the
courts of equity, not only to abate an existing nuisance, but, to do what the courts
of law could not do-interpose and prevent threatened nuisances, and, by perpetual
injunction, make their remedies effectual throughout all future time.
288. See notes 135-162 and accompanying text, supra.
289. No Washington cases have been found, but this proposition seems self-evident.
In a damage action, a governmental entity would be suing as an individual in the sense
that its power to sue would be of a similar scope and nature.
290. Note that "special injury" in this context refers to the right to bring an action,
not the measure of damages.
291. WASH. R v. CODE § 7.24.020 (1956). See notes 198-199 and accompanying text,
supra.

292. See notes 203-208 and accompanying text, supra.
293. See notes 211-212, supra; Ames Lake Community Club v. State, 69 Wn 2d 769,
420 P.2d 363 (1966); Botton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966).
The statutes referred to in notes 211-212 apply only to tort liability. All public
nuisances are theoretically crimes. See note 272, supra. Nevertheless, their criminal nature
is questionable at best when the public nuisance is created by a governmental entity.
Even assuming that public nuisances are crimes, however, they also constitute tortious
conduct, and liability should follow under the statutes. See note 297 and accompanying
text, infra (statute authorizes civil action); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 82 1C,
comment a (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969) (liability in tort for public nuisance); cf. cases
cited in note 294, infra.
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courts appear to be quite willing to entertain public nuisance actions
against cities and counties, notwithstanding their authority to declare
certain conduct to be or not to be a public nuisance. 94 It would appear
that public nuisance actions against governmental entities should be
recognized, since such actions may be the only immediate recourse
of an individual or another governmental entity against land use
abuses by governments. Such actions would generally be limited by
express legislative declarations based on the public interest, as would
any other public nuisance action. 95
Generally, a public officer, the state, or a municipality may bring a
civil or criminal action for public nuisance.29 On the other hand, the
29
statutes provide: 7
A private person may maintain a civil action for a public
nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself but not otherwise.
294. See notes 209, 210, 212, supra; Elves v. King County, 49 Wn. 2d 201, 299 P.2d
206 (1956); Shields v. Spokane School Dist., 31 Wn. 2d 247, 196 P.2d 352 (1948); Bales
v. Tacoma, 172 Wash. 494, 20 P.2d 860 (1933).
295. See notes 246-252 and accompanying text, supra.

296. See State ex rel. Tollefson v. Mitchell, 25 Wn. 2d 476, 171 P.2d 245 (1946);
State v. Lew, 25 Wn. 2d 854, 172 P.2d 289 (1946); State v. Terry, 99 Wash. 1, 168
P. 513 (1917).

For statutory authorizations of cities and towns, see notes 262-263, supra; prosecuting
attorneys, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.27.020(3), (4) (1963); attorney general, see
WASH. tv.
CoDE §§ 43.10.030(1), (2), (4) (1965).
297. WASH. RPv. CODE § 7.48.210 (1957).
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1007 (1966) explains

the reasoning behind the rule:
The reasons for the requirement of particular damage have been stated many times.

The plaintiff did not and could not represent the king, and the vindication of royal
rights was properly left to his duly constituted officers. This is no less true when
the rights of the crown have passed to the general public. Defendants are not to
be harassed, and the time of the courts taken up, with complaints about public
matters from a multitude who claim to have suffered. And at least in the ordinary
case the interference with most of the public will be, if not entirely theoretical or
potential, at least minor, petty and trivial. This insistence upon the rejection of the
trivial has been especially marked in the decisions ....
The special injury requirement could be conceptualized as a matter of standing to sue,
with analysis based on that concept; however, the long history of the special injury
requirement and the numerous cases addressed to it lead to the conclusion that it
should be analyzed in light of these particular cases. See Prosser, Private Action for
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966). It seems that most questions of standing
are considered in the context of the substantive issues presented. See, e.g., Peck,
Standing Requirements for Obtaining Review of Governmental Action in Washington,
35 WASH. L. REv. 362 (1960) (relationship between administrative agencies and the
judiciary); Note, The Essence of Standing: The Basis of a Constitutional Right to
be Heard, 10 Aaz. L. REv. 438 (1968) (constitutionality of legislation). See generally
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
YALE LJ. 816 (1969).
Of course, substantial interference with the plaintiff's rights will be required in order
for him to bring a private action for public nuisance, and this requirement must be met
in addition to the special injury requirement.
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This right exists, notwithstanding criminal29 or abatement proceedings299 having been brought by the public, and it is generally held that
if the plaintiff's circumstances cause him to suffer a kind of harm
which the public at large or members of the public in general do not
suffer, he has sustained special injury. ° Ownership of property injured by a public nuisance is generally recognized as constituting
special injury, 0 1 but other types of injury may be required if the
damages complained of are not to property. ° 2 It would appear that
class actions brought by large numbers of individuals specially injured
by a public nuisance would be effective against certain types of interferences, like those affecting a neighborhood or persons engaged in
certain occupations. 3
The special injury requirement has generated a conflict between
those who argue that an individual must suffer a different kind of injury
from the public in order to show special injury and those who argue

298. See note 282, supra.
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.180 (1957).
300. The court has long held that the injury to the plaintiff must differ in kind from
the injury to the public, not just differ in degree. See Jones v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Manitoba Ry., 16 Wash. 25, 47 P. 226 (1896); Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63
P. 239 (1900); Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35 Wash. 92, 76 P. 513 (1904).
The early cases tended to impose a strict requirement of special injury, tending to
restrict private actions; see Jones, supra. Jones was overruled by Sholin v. Skamania
Boom Co., 56 Wash. 303, 105 P. 632 (1909). Subsequent cases suggest a fairly
liberal special injury requirement which extends to the point of obscuring the "kinddegree" distinction. See Ingalls v. Eastman, 61 Wash. 289, 112 P. 372 (1910); Vetter v.
K & K Timber Co., 124 Wash. 151, 213 P. 927 (1923); Lampa v. Graham, 179 Wash.
184, 36 P. 2d 543 (1934) ; Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn. 2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955).
PROSSER, at 609, comments:
But the confusion which surrounds the whole matter, the uncertainty which has
prevailed as to what is "kind" or "degree," and the occasional tendency to find a
difference in kind where one may at least suspect that only one in degree is really
present, suggest that this is, if anything, an argument in favor of allowing recovery
to anyone who suffers actual damage.
See notes 304-308 and accompanying text, infra; see generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 821C (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969); Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance,
52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
301. See Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn. 2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946); Anderson v.
Nichols, 152 Wash. 315, 278 P. 161 (1929); Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35 Wash. 92, 76 P.
513 (1904).
302. See Olsen v. Bremerton, 110 Wash. 572, 188 P. 772 (1920); cf. Diking Dist. No.
2 v. Calispel Duck Club, 11 Wn. 2d 131, 118 P.2d 780 (1941).
303. WAsH. CIV. R. SUPER. CT. 23 specifies the requirements for bringing class actions.
These requirements appear to be met in the case of many private actions for public
nuisance, and class actions should be encouraged by the courts to settle appropriate
cases. But see Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn. 2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955) (upholding action
of individuals, but not of class).
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that a greater degree of injury is sufficient. s0 4 This dichotomy is prob
ably more academic than might be suspected at first glance, and in
any event the Washington court has tended to obscure the kind-degree
dichotomy to the point where it is fairly safe to say that the distinction
does not decide the issue of special injury. 0 5
As a matter of policy, a-strict special injury requirement would seem
to be based on the premise that non-enforcement is a legitimate
technique of administering public laws. 306 There appear to be only two
legitimate arguments for such administrative- decisions. They are:
(1) that non-enforcement of the public's rights is justified by the circumstances of a particular case, or (2) that there are insufficient
public funds to prosecute a particular action, in view of the demands
on available funds by higher public priorities. The first of these arguments is probably without justification from the public interest point
of view, 0 7 but in any event, the refusal of public officials to take action
should not deprive a person who suffers substantial injury from re-

304. See RESTATEVXNT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 821C, Note to Institute (Tent. Draft
No. 15, 1969); Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966).
305. See cases cited note 300, supra.
In Washington, a public nuisance can be found where certain rights of a considerable
number of individuals are interfered with. See note 235, supra. It is therefore possible
to have a public nuisance without any rights common to the public being affected. It
seems that in these cases, the special injury requirement could not require injury
different in kind from the public's injury because there is no injury to the public at
large. This should be a persuasive argument in favor of abandoning the difference in
kind rationale of special injury in Washington. There is support for this view even in
the older English cases. F. POLLOCK, TnE LAW OF TORTS *336 (1887), in his discussion
of nuisance, states:
Where a distinct private right is infringed, though it be only a right enjoyed in
common with other persons, it is immaterial that the plaintiff suffered no specific
injury beyond those other persons, or no specific injury at all. Thus any one commoner can sue a stranger who lets his cattle depasture the common; and any one
of a number of inhabitants entitled by local custom to a particular water supply
can sue a neighbour who obstructs that supply. (Emphasis added).
306. Legislative decisions to bar nuisance actions can be implemented by legislative
authorization of certain conduct; thus, the legislature can extinguish or limit private or
public nuisance actions regardless of the special injury requirement. See notes 95-100,
232-252 and accompanying text, supra. This means that only administrative decisions to
not enforce public nuisance law are affected by private actions, and the special injury
requirement protects only these decisions.
307. If public nuisance law prohibits conduct which should not be prohibited, the
statutory and decisional law should be modified, but the discretion of the prosecuting
authority should not be invoked. When administrative discretion is relied on, it results
in overbroad prohibitions with selective enforcement, thus permitting the administrative
authority to select those offenders who will be prosecuted. This creates opportunities for
abuse of certain individuals who are prosecuted for acts which are not the object of real
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covering for his injury just because the injury also occurs to the entire
community or neighborhood. The second argument might justify a
public official's refusal to bring an action, but a private action under
such circumstances should be permitted and perhaps welcomed by the
public as a means of securing ancillary public benefits.
It is not suggested that any remedy should be granted in any individual's attempt to bring a public nuisance action, and limitations on
private remedies by legislative enactment are definitely justified;30"
however, there is justification for adopting a liberal judicial standard
of special injury, as the Washington court appears to have done, since
non-enforcement as a technique of administering public law does not
justify severe restraints on private actions for damages.
III. ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Nuisance Constituting Trespass
It has already been noted that some physical invasions of property
might constitute a trespass as well as a nuisance, while some physical
invasions, such as those involving air-borne particles which are deposited on the plaintiff's property, are actionable in Washington only
as nuisances."0 9 There are procedural advantages in trespass actions,
such as a longer period under the statute of limitations and no need to
prove substantial injury, which have led plaintiffs to argue that certain
air-borne invasions constitute a trespass and are actionable as such,
public concern and enables certain individuals who can exert political pressure to escape
prosecutions which would be in the public interest.
308. See note 102 and accompanying text, supra; but cf. Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35
Wash. 92, 76 P. 513 (1904) (injunction against public nuisance in action by neighboring
property owner).
309. The Washington court has consistently held that the two year statute of limitations applies to nuisance actions, including actions for invasions of air-borne particles.
See note 195, supra.
The issue was squarely decided in Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481
(W.D. Wash. 1954) aff'd 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), where the district court applied
the two year statute and refused to award nominal damages, stating at 488:
In an action on the case, it is necessary for plaintiff to allege and prove more than
formal injury; but when trespass be proven, liability is absolute and at least
nominal damage must be awarded. Even though it were assumed that solids in
the form of minute particulates from defendant's plants have been deposited on
plaintiffs' lands, the injury, if any, resulting therefrom was consequential, the action
is on the case, and awards of nominal damages would not be justified by the facts
or required by the law.
See Note, Trespass-Unseen Particles Constituting Invasion-Distinguished from Nuisance, 35 WAsr. L. REv. 474 (1960).
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and some courts have recognized such invasions as trespasses. 1° The
reasoning of such courts is based upon the fact that there is no
material difference between an invasion of a large visible object and a
small or molecular particle. 31 1 The recognition of such offenses as
trespasses undoubtedly offers the ultimate in protection to landowners
who suffer from air pollution, partly because of the procedural advantages noted above, but largely because most air polluters create
310. Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Or. 1959)
decided that under Oregon law, invasions of air-borne particulates constituted a trespass,
the court stating at 184:
As the Oregon Supreme Court has never been faced with a situation as here involved, this court must anticipate what that court would hold if confronted with
a controversy such as that presented here.
The court discussed the Arvidson case, supra note 309, and concluded that it reflected
Washington law, which was not applicable to the Fairview Farms case. The court noted
that a motion was made in Arvidson to remove the case to the Oregon District Court
and that the motion was refused because the Oregon court had no jurisdiction
to adjudicate trespasses on real property in Washington. 176 F. Supp. at 188.
The Fairview Farms court anticipated the Oregon Supreme Court's decision correctly,
since Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), noted in 35
WAsH. L. Rnv. 474 (1960), 45 Coam-cu L.Q. 836 (1960), 39 TEx. L. Rxv. 243 (1960),
1961 WAsH. U.L.Q. 62, rendered a similar holding less than a month later. The
principle upon which the Martin opinion was based was stated at 342 P.2d 792 as the
basic distinction between trespass and nuisance:
Trespass and private nuisance are separate fields of tort liability relating to actionable interference with the possession of land. They may be distinguished by comparing the nature of the interest invaded; an actionable invasion of a possessor's
interest in the exclusive possession of land is a trespass; an actionable invasion of
a possessor's interest in the use and enjoyment of his land is a nuisance.
The court thoroughly discussed the cases, authorities and reasoning underlying the arguments, and at 793-94 concluded:
It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had not yet peered into the
molecular and atomic world of small particles, the courts could not fit an invasion
through unseen physical instrumentalities into the requirement that a trespass can
result only from a direct invasion. But in this atomic age even the uneducated know
the great and awful force contained in the atom and what it can do to a man's
property if it is released ....
The force is just as real if it is chemical in nature and
must be awakened by the intervention of another agency before it does harm.
If, then, we must look to the character of the instrumentality which is used in
making an intrusion upon another's land we prefer to emphasize the object's energy
or force rather than its size. Viewed in this way, we may define trespass as any
intrusion which invades the possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession,
whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which
can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicist.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the intrusion of the fluoride particulates
in the present case constituted a trespass.
See generally Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air
Pollution, 10 Aazz. L. Rv. 107 (1968).
For discussions of similar problems and the doctrinal difficulties they pose, see
Corbridge and Moses, Weather Modification: Law and Administration, 8 NAT. REs. J.
207 (1968); Note, Legal Remedies for "Cloud-Seeding" Activities: Nuisance or Trespass?,
1960 Duxn L.J. 305. See also Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1953] 3 W.L.R.
773, [1954) 3 W.L.R. 200, noted in 1954 CAia L.J. 172; 17 MoD. L. REv. 579 (1954);
106 L.J. 35 (1956) (tanker in emergency pumping oil into sea near beach).
311. See note 310, supra.

115

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 47, 1970

public nuisances which would require special injury to be shown before
a private action could be brought, while trespass actions by landowners do not require a showing of special injury.31 Under Washington law, there is also a possibility that joint liability may be imposed
on more than one contributor to such a trespass, but that the liability
of contributors to a nuisance would be several. 1 ' The Washington
court should recognize invasions of property by air-borne substances as
trespasses, extending to plaintiffs in such actions the advantages of
suing in trespass rather than nuisance.
B. Nuisance Constituting Constitutional Taking or Damaging
One of the fundamental rights protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment is the right to just compensation for
private property which is taken for public use.3 14 Traditionally, a
physical invasion of land was required in order for a taking of property
to be found, and the physical invasion requirement excluded many
nuisances from the protection of the just compensation requirement. 1 5
312. The statutory period of limitations is generally longer in trespass actions. See
notes 309-310, supra. In addition, substantial injury need not be proved in trespass
cases, but it must be shown in nuisance actions. See note 309, supra. It would also appear
that a plaintiff would not have as serious a problem with statutes authorizing conduct
in trespass cases, since there is no express statutory declaration that such conduct cannot
be deemed a trespass, but there is such a statute applicable to nuisance. See notes 95-102,
246-252, and accompanying text, supra; but cf. Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F.
Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954) aff'd 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), discussed in notes 309310, supra.
Even though a court concludes that an invasion of particulates constitutes a trespass
for some purposes to the advantage of the plaintiff, it may conclude that the action
sounds in nuisance for other purposes of advantage to the plaintiff. For example, some
courts have held that the statute of limitations for trespass applies, but that an action
is not barred by a statute giving an administrative agency "primary jurisdiction" over
air pollution, because the statute expressly exempted nuisance actions from the "primary
jurisdiction" bar. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 978 (D. Or. 1963) aff'd
337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964); Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D.
Or. 1963); see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.94.230, .370 (1969) (nuisance actions and air
pollution control).
The special injury requirement should not restrict private actions for public nuisance
in air pollution cases; however, a strict interpretation of the requirement could preclude
a finding that the plaintiffs suffered injury different in kind from the public. See notes
297-308, and accompanying text, supra.
313. Robillard v. Selah-Moxie Irr. Dist., 54 Wn. 2d 582, 343 P.2d 565 (1969) strongly
suggests that independent contributors to torts other than nuisances are jointly liable,
whereas independent contributors to nuisances are severally liable. See notes 214-220 and
accompanying text, supra.
314. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); see E. CORWIN, TnH
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1177-85 (N. Small ed. 1964).
315. See Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955, rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963), noted in 16 VAND. L. Rxv. 430 (1963);
see also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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The Washington state constitution, however, requires just compensation for taking or damaging property. 16 In a recent case, the court
held that this language requires compensation for interferences with
property which are not trespassory, and that no physical invasion of
property is needed in order to require that just compensation be
paid.3 17 This case was based upon basic nuisance concepts, although in
form it was an inverse condemnation rather than a nuisance action.318
The case noted above and several other cases suggest that the plaintiff's right to freedom from interferences which constitute nuisances
is a property right, of which he cannot be deprived without just compensation. 19 This proposition presents no insurmountable difficulties
316. WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § 16.
317. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964) held that article
1, § 16 of the Washington State Constitution required that owners of residential property
near Seattle-Tacoma International Airport be compensated for the interference with the
use of their land caused by low altitude flights of jet aircraft which did not invade the
airspace directly over the plaintiffs' lands. The court based its decision on its conclusion
that an earlier case which involved direct overflights, Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55
Wn. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), had construed the term "property," as used in Article
1, § 16, "to include the unrestricted right to use, enjoy, and dispose of the land." 64
Wn. 2d at 313. The court then addressed itself to the traditional "taking" problem at
316-18:
This requirement, that a landowner show a direct overflight as a condition precedent
to recovery of the damages to his land, is presently stressed by some federal courts
in construing the "taking" as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment ...
We are unable to accept the premise that recovery for the interference with the
use of land should depend upon anything as irrelevant as whether a wing tip of
the aircraft passes through a fraction of an inch of the airspace directly above
the plaintiff's land. The plaintiffs are not seeking recovery for a technical trespass,
but for a combination of circumstances engendered by the near-by flights which
interfere with the -se and enjoyment of their land. (Emphasis added).
In addition to the above, further reason exists in Washington for refusing to
adopt the overly strict interpretation of "taking" pressed by the appellant. The language of the ninth amendment of the Washington Constitution provides for just
compensation of not only a "taking," but also a "damaging." The specific purpose
of the addition of language beyond that of the United States Constitution is to
avoid the distinctions attached to the word "taking" appropriate to a bygone era.
318. See cases cited in note 317, supra.
319. Id.
Snavely v. Goldendale, 10 Wn. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941) held that a city's pollution of water was of sufficient magnitude to constitute a public nuisance, and was
therefore a taking or damaging of property requiring just compensation under the
Washington Constitution. The court expressly refers to the concept of public nuisance
in its opinion, making it quite clear that nuisance theory is an adequate rationale to
support a claim for protection under the Washington Constitution. See also Thornburg
v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (discussion of airport noise case
in terms of nuisance and the just compensation requirement).
Several other Washington cases suggest that the court is liberalizing the just compensation requirement generally. Note, Liability for Diking Floodwaters:-Rejection of the
"Common Enemy" Doctrine, 44 WASH. L. Rv.516, 520 n.23 (1969) notes that:
[T]he Washington court has held the word "damages" in Article 1 § 16 of the state
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for the development of nuisance law;' 2 0 however, there is an additional
provision of the Washington constitution which could be of adverse
consequence to the development of private nuisance law, namely, the
prohibition of taking private property for private use.121 While this
provision may limit the authority of the legislature and the courts, it
will probably not interfere with reasonable modifications of the substantive and remedial law of nuisance, and it should be regarded as a
valuable safeguard of property rights since it will offer some protection
against extreme actions by governmental entities. 22 In this regard,
counsel should consider the possibility of a cause of action based on
the Washington constitution in cases where defenses peculiar to
nuisance actions present serious hazards to a cause of action based
solely on nuisance.

constitution extends just compensation to damages beyond those compensable under
the United States Constitution. Brown v. Seattle, S Wash. 35, 41, 31 P. 313, 315
(1892) ; Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 34, 198 P. 377, 379 (1921); Martin
v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964). The cases have extended
compensable damages so that distance from public works, Wendel v. Spokane
County, 27 Wash. 121, 124, 67 P. 576, 577-578 (1902), substantiality of damage,
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn. 2d 400, 405, 348 P.2d 664, 667 (1960) ; Martin
v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309, 318, 391 P.2d 540, 546 (1964), willfulness of
the damage, Boitano v. Snohomish County, 11 Wn. 2d 664, 120 P.2d 490 (1941),
and even physical invasion of property, Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309,
316, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (1964) may be irrelevant in determining whether they are
compensable.
See generally Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect
and Prospect, 71 DICK. L. REV. 207 (1967); Munro, Aircraft Noise as a Taking of
Property, 13 N.Y.L.F. 476 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964); Comment, Nuisance-As a "Taking" of Property, 17 U. MIaMI L. REV. 537
(1963); Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort,
38 WAsH. L. REV. 607 (1963); Comment, Inverse Condemnation: A Growing Problem?,
3 TxnsA L.J. 169 (1966).
320. See notes 321-322, infra.
321. WASH. CONST. art. I § 16 provides:
Whenever an attempt is
Private property shall not be taken for private use ....
made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question of whether
the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as
such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.
This provision could be construed to prevent substantial modifications of the substantive
rights now recognized under the concept of nuisance. However, the constitutional language suggests that the likelihood of this interpretation by the court is remote, i.e., the
quoted language applies to "takings" of private property whereas the just compensation
provision applies to "taking" or "damaging" property. Since the court's decisions recognizing nuisances as requiring compensation emphasize the term "damaging," it would
seem that such holdings would not necessarily result in concluding that a nuisance
plaintiff's rights were so extensive as to be "untouchable" for private use.
321. See also Missouri Pac. Ry. v. State of Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); E.
CORWIN, ThE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1177-85 (N. Small
ed. 1964) (federal due process question relating to takings of property for a private use).
322. If the court held that plaintiffs' rights under nuisance concepts were protected
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CONCLUSION
Any analysis of nuisance law has dangerous pitfalls, in light of the
reluctance of the courts to base their decisions on a system of articulated rules, and these pitfalls probably account for the legal community's apparently increasing reluctance to utilize nuisance as a
mode of land use control. On the other hand, nuisance law appears to
have the potential to play a viable and important role in the total
system of land use controls, and this suggests that there is a need to
analyze its principles and utilize it as a modern land use control device.
These observations have led to the analysis presented in this comment
and its suggestions for development and application of nuisance law.
The basic approach of the comment has been to elucidate the principles
of nuisance law and the factors affecting court decisions on nuisance
in an attempt to aid in applying nuisance law to novel land use problems which are continually arising in a dynamic and complex era of
land utilization.
As for the apparent reluctance of practitioners to use nuisance
actions, it is suspected that the main reasons for this reluctance are:
(1) the availability of zoning and other administrative mechanisms for
individuals to effect controls on a neighboring owner's uses of his land;
and (2) the modern tendency of many lawyers to believe that legislative and administrative land use control systems are the most effective
mechanisms to employ for their clients. Perhaps these reasons are
sufficient to justify a decision to argue an individual case before an
administrative board rather than a court; but from the public's point
of view, a board responsible for determining the public interest and
effecting that interest by enacting comprehensive land use controls is
not an appropriate forum for deciding individual cases based on

by the no private property for private use provision of WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16, it is
possible that legislative or judicial restrictions on injunctive remedies would be held
unconstitutional. For example, a statute might provide that a land use located in a
proper zone but causing a nuisance could not be enjoined. Without the injunctive
remedy, the plaintiff's property would, in effect, be "taken;" this being prohibited by

the provision. See note 260, supra.

It appears probable, however, that the no-taking-for-private-use provision will not
be applied to nuisance, whereas the just compensation requirement will. See note 321,
supra. The legislature and courts should therefore have power to limit remedies, except
that the plaintiff's rights to just compensation (or damages) must be preserved. Land
owners would thus seem to be protected from legislative or judicial decisions extinguishing causes of action or damage remedies.
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private interest, especially where private actions with effective remedies are available to protect property owners injured by particular
types or manners of land use.
Thus, it seems that nuisance law should be recognized as a modern
mode of land use control and integrated with other modern modes of
land use control. If this is done, the flexibility and appropriateness of
nuisance law for certain types of land use problems should result in a
more effective over-all system of land use control.
William H. Wilson*
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n B.A. 1962, J.D. 1970, University of Washington.
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